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Preface/Acknowledgments
The thesis that you are now reading is substantially different from the one that I
set out to write a year ago. I originally wanted to write about European integration. I,
like many idealists before me, thought of regional political integration as the next step in
the progression of civilization. I viewed the European Union as the first (relatively)
successful experiment toward that end and wanted to conduct a study that would
explore the problems associated with nations sacrificing their sovereignty and national
identities in the name of integration, with the hope of exploring how those problems
have been overcome in the past.
Great Britain, as one of the European Union’s most prominent-yet-ambivalent
members, jumped out to me as the perfect potential case study. I was fascinated by
Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s attempt to convince Britons that joining with Europe
was the right decision, by his potential kamikaze tactic of letting Britons decide for
themselves in the country’s first-ever national referendum in 1975, and by their ultimate
decision to stay in Europe despite decades of widespread resistance. Britain’s
relationship with Europe was by no means smooth sailing after that; its refusal to be a
part of the Eurozone was the most prominent example of British ambivalence.
Nevertheless, the fact was that in 1975 Britons were given the choice to leave the
European Community - something that they had largely been clamoring for since they
joined – and they turned it down. I wanted to understand why, and I hoped to
illuminate the issue by contrasting it with Wilson’s earlier failed attempt at convincing
Britons that their future was with Europe in 1967. As such, the basic structure of this
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thesis was decided from the beginning, but due in large part to the events of the past
year its purpose has significantly changed.
At almost the very moment that I began researching this thesis, rumblings began
to emerge about out-of-control debt in Greece and elsewhere in Europe. Over the next
few months, the Eurozone crisis exploded. Old wounds were reopened. The British
press was full of stories denouncing the European Union – both the irresponsible
practices that led to the crisis and the new austerity measures being proposed by
Germany in exchange for financial support. As I researched Britain’s public debates
over Europe in 1967 and 1975, I was struck by how similar the discourse was between
then and now. My time researching in London in January 2012 reinforced this opinion.
When mentioning to someone what I was researching, I was almost always met with an
incensed “I’ll tell you what we think about the EU…” The subsequent reviews were
rarely glowing, and mirrored the language used in 1967 and 1975 to a startling degree.
The issues that I was researching were still alive and well. It seemed that little had
changed since 1967 in the way that Britons thought about Europe.
Around that time, I realized that when I set out to write this thesis I had started
with the wrong question. Before asking “why do states integrate,” I first had to
understand national identity. How are national identities formed? How are they
shifted? Once set, can they ever really be changed? What is the role of history in that
process? The following pages represent my attempt to grapple with those questions.
This thesis owes a great debt to many people in my life. The first and most
important group must be my family and friends. I would be lost without the support
and love that they provide. I am particularly indebted to my older sister Katie. I never
4

would have learned to push myself if I had not been constantly driven to compete with
her brilliance throughout my childhood, and as an adult I count her as one of my dearest
friends. She is also now a doctor, which is neither here nor there, but I enjoy bragging
about it. Thanks as well to my housemate and good friend Joe Leffler, a fellow history
thesis writer. As comrades-in-arms, we bounced ideas off each other until there were no
more to bounce.
I owe my deepest thanks to Leonard V. Smith, my advisor and mentor
throughout this process. His guidance, his support, his feedback, his high standards,
and his willingness to challenge my ideas and point me in different directions with a
smile on his face have all been invaluable to this project and to my wider life. It has
been an absolute privilege to work with him. Finally, thank you to Renee Romano,
whose Historical Memory course sparked a passion and shaped many of the ideas in this
thesis, and whose Honors seminar (and its accompanying baked goods) kept me and
every other thesis writer on-track and sane over the past year.
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Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role.
-Dean Acheson, 1963
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Introduction
“One Tiny, Damp Little Island”
Poor loves. Trained to Empire, trained to rule the waves. All gone. All taken away.
Bye-bye, world.
-John Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, 1974
___________________________________

Beginning with the massive success of From Russia with Love, published in 1957,
Ian Fleming became Britain’s premiere adventure novelist. His hero, James Bond,
captured the British imagination by offering what historian David Cannadine called a
cocktail of “great-power nostalgia, imperial escapism and national reassurance” at a
time when British power was on the decline.1 In Fleming’s novels, the endlessly capable
Bond made a career out of upstaging the blustering Americans, represented by Bond’s
counterpart Felix Leiter. Bond – and by extension Great Britain – kept the West
together in secret while the Americans did all the talking.2 This escapist fantasy acted as
a tonic to the British nation which, in the wake of World War II, saw its empire begin to
crumble, its economy falter, and its national pride erode. Countless Britons indulged in
this fantasy, and for many it was no fantasy at all; to them, Britain still was a great
power, waiting in the wings for a moment of national renewal. The Bond narrative,
however, was not without its alternatives.
By the 1970s, former intelligence officer John Le Carré had displaced Ian Fleming
as Britain’s premiere spy novelist. Where Fleming’s world was a projected fantasy of
continued British global relevance, Le Carré’s characters represented a generation of
David Cannadine, In Churchill’s Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern Britain, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), p. 281
2 ibid, p. 304
1
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individuals becoming disillusioned with that same fantasy. At the height of his
popularity, beginning with 1963’s The Spy Who Came in from the Cold and culminating
in the 1974 release of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, Le Carré wrote a series of novels that
featured members of the World War II generation coming to terms with Britain’s
declining world role and accompanying moral decay. Britons were raised to believe that
they occupied a special place in the world because their Empire occupied a special place
in the world; if the latter were no longer true, neither was the former. What, Le Carré
asked, did it mean to be a Briton in an era when the traditional conception of British
identity was gone? That question tore apart Le Carré’s characters. Some committed
suicide; some became Soviet spies; some plugged away at meaningless bureaucratic
desk jobs and led unfulfilled lives. All of them served to illustrate the dangers that faced
Britain if its national identity remained stuck in the past.
The progression from Fleming to Le Carré as Britain’s novelist du jour accurately
reflected the shift in the way that Britons viewed themselves which took place during the
1960s and 1970s. From the end of World War II until the 1970s, Winston Churchill’s
narrative of World War II as Britain’s “Finest Hour” dominated British national identity.
The narrative argued that by standing up to Hitler when the rest of Europe fell, Britons
reasserted that they were a unique people with a history of greatness, even if they lost
their empire. If they continued to keep calm and carry on, as the iconic posters that
peppered London during the blitz advised, they would persevere over any challenge.
Unfortunately for Britons, time proved this narrative to be divorced from reality. By
embracing a national identity that emphasized going it alone – a national identity in
denial of the realities of the present – Britain risked dooming itself to true international
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irrelevance. Keeping calm and carrying on had achieved Britons nothing in the past two
decades. By the 1970s they were ready for something new.
This work examines the moment that Britons – political leaders and common
citizens alike – finally undertook the painful process of forging a new national identity
to fit a changed world. The event that forced this shift in identity was the British
application for entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). Often referred to
in Britain as the Common Market, the EEC was at its heart a free trade zone in Western
Europe that sought to build up Europe as a financially independent bloc of countries
that could act as a counterweight to the bipolar Cold War world order dominated by the
United States in the West and the Soviet Union in the East. Though it was primarily an
economic arrangement in the 1960s and 1970s, from the outset its founders envisioned
it as laying the groundwork for a lasting political union in Western Europe. This, more
than its economic policies, was Britain’s primary objection to the EEC in the
organization’s early years.
Britain’s process of joining the EEC was long and contentious. The UK first
applied to the EEC under Harold MacMillan’s Conservative Party government in 1963.
However, France’s nationalistic President Charles DeGaulle, convinced that Britain was
a puppet of the United States and would therefore undermine the intended
independence of the EEC, vetoed British entry. This turn of events was much to the
relief of most of the British public. EEC entry was viewed as a betrayal of all that was
British – the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament and the independence of Britain as
a politically and culturally separate entity from continental Europe.
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In 1967, Britain applied to the EEC again under the Labour government of
Harold Wilson. This time, however, the debate was different. That is to say, there was a
debate. Public resistance to joining the EEC was still widespread, and was even more
ferocious than before. The notion of joining the EEC fundamentally challenged nearly
every aspect of the makeshift national identity to which Britons had been clinging since
the end of World War II. Nevertheless, there were a great many voices in support of the
EEC as well. For the moment it did not matter, as De Gaulle again vetoed Britain’s
application. Britain finally entered the EEC in 1972 – after both De Gaulle and Wilson
were no longer in power – under the leadership of the Conservative Prime Minister
Edward Heath. The legwork, however, had been done under Wilson.
Then in 1975, Harold Wilson, back in office as Prime Minister, held the first
public referendum in British history. The question: should the United Kingdom remain
in the EEC under renegotiated terms? The referendum, although constitutionally nonbinding in the UK where sovereignty lies not with the public but with Parliament, was a
material manifestation of Wilson’s argument it was ultimately up to the British public to
decide what sort of nation Britain would become. The real question at the heart of the
1975 referendum was much broader than contention over a trade agreement. It was
more important than Britain’s traditions and institutions. The referendum asked:
“What is Britain? Is it the same nation that it has always been, or could it finally become
something new?” In 1975 the British public overwhelmingly voted in favor of something
new. By a majority of 67.2%, they voted to stay in the EEC.
In examining the shift in British identity that was revealed by the EEC debates of
the 1960s and 1970s, this thesis will take snapshots of the two most revealing moments
10

of that process: the 1967 public debate and the 1975 referendum. The 1967 debate was
the point at which Britain’s “Finest Hour” identity was challenged most directly and
fought back the hardest. As such, it serves as a perfect window into the nature of that
identity at its highest tide. The 1975 debate was the counter-point, the moment when
the old identity was definitively cast aside in favor of a new identity closer to Europe,
albeit only for that moment. Together, these two debates served to bookend Britain’s
identity crisis. By analyzing only these two moments rather than presenting a narrative
that links them together, this thesis hopes to emphasize how sharply they contrast. It
can be viewed as a comparison between two case studies: one in which an old national
identity was held in place by the weight of history despite a direct challenge, and one in
which the same national identity was successfully challenged by the adoption of a new
historical narrative.
As Prime Minister, Harold Wilson was the instigator of both of these moments
and played a key role in enabling and encouraging a shift in British national identity.
Though his decision to bring Britain into the European Community was based on a
pragmatic economic calculus, and though he embraced the 1975 referendum as a means
of controlling his own party, once Wilson made up his mind about something he
committed absolutely. To convince Britons that joining the EEC was the best option for
their future, in 1967 he promoted a narrative of British history that contradicted
Churchill’s. Churchill’s vision of British history – the one that was entrenched in British
culture by the 1960s – saw Britain as a unique land apart, having more in common with
other English-speaking nations than with the fratricidal Europeans that Britain saved
from endless infighting time and again. Wilson’s narrative was quite different. oro him,
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British history was a forward progression from chaos to ever-expanding order. Tribes
were replaced by clans, clans by kingdoms, and kingdoms by the United Kingdom.
Joining with Europe was simply the next stage in that inevitable evolution. As such,
Wilson’s desire to bring Britain into Europe was driven by hard statistics, but his
argument to the public involved a broad rewrite of British history and a call for a new
national identity.
Similarly, Wilson’s decision to embrace the 1975 referendum began as a political
tactic to keep his party in line, but became a complete reconceptualization of Britons’
relationship to their government. In Britain, sovereignty lies with Parliament; the
public’s only official role is to routinely elect the members of the House of Commons. As
Walter Bagehot argued in his influential work The English Constitution, this unique
form of government was a result of the particular vicissitudes of British history.
Bagehot posited that the endurance of Britain’s Parliamentary system can be traced to
the fact that Britons never stopped viewing the Sovereign as the uniting heart of their
nation coupled with a contradictory desire for a more republican government. Thus,
“the appendages of a monarchy have been converted into the essence of a republic; only
[in Britain], because of a more numerous heterogeneous political population, it is
needful to keep the ancient show while we secretly interpolate the new reality.”3 A key
part of this balancing act is maintaining the tradition that Parliament is elected by the
people, but once elected acts with absolute sovereignty. This allows Parliament to make
unpopular decisions – and risk dissolution – while the Sovereign remains above the fray
and maintains his/her purity as a unifying symbol.

3

Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, (Second Edition, 1873), p. 209-210
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Wilson did not formally set out to change this; rather, he argued to all who would
listen that the results of the 1975 referendum might not be legally binding on
Parliament, but that Parliament had to abide by them anyway. The referendum needed
no formal constitutional revision to be binding. It represented the will of the people,
and the will of the people must come first, regardless of centuries of storied tradition
and regardless of the letter of the law. This was a source of major debate in Britain, a
nation that takes tradition very seriously. Wilson’s argument, however, gave Britons an
unprecedented level of direct ownership over their nation and its future. Wilson
empowered Britons to take their history into their own hands and use it to decide what
their nation could be by asserting that Parliamentary Sovereignty was a bluff; that
despite tradition, the spirit of Britain had always lived in the people and Britain’s future
was theirs to guide.
This thesis argues that a nation’s identity creates the framework and parameters
in which it can act, that its identity is powerfully shaped by its history, and therefore that
history exerts a substantial, concrete force on the present. The past is not merely a
backdrop or a tool to be used by canny politicians; it is an independent actor that can be
difficult to overcome. It frames the discursive choices available to a population. In
Britain, history stood as a major impediment to the British attempt at finding a new
place in the world when its old place was lost. After a long, painful struggle, however,
Britons were able to resist its pull and turn toward the future, if only for a moment.
They did so not by rejecting their history, but by reframing and marshaling it in order to
create a new narrative and thus a new national identity. History is sometimes a
roadblock and sometimes a tool, but it is always at the heart of national identity.
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British National Identity
From the birth of Great Britain in 1707 until World War II, Britain’s national
identity was rooted in the twin pillars of the British Empire and separation from Europe.
In Britons, the definitive study of British national identity in the age of empire, historian
Linda Colley argues that the Empire left such a lasting mark on the British psyche
because it provided material proof of what Britons viewed as their preordained destiny:
to lead the world into an age of enlightened civilization.4 Britons viewed themselves as
chosen by God for this task, and the Empire was their proof. Thus, the existence of the
Empire became closely knit with British pride. If the Empire was the proof of Britain’s
God-given greatness, Britons would lose their greatness should the Empire ever cease to
exist.
The other key to traditional British national identity was that it stood in
opposition to what Britons saw as a European – and particularly a French – identity.
Identities must always be to some extent oppositional; for there to be an in-group, there
must be an out-group. As Colley notes, “imagining the French as their vile opposites, as
Hyde to their Jekyll, became a way for Britons… to contrive for themselves a converse
and flattering identity.”5 France was Catholic, so Britain took pride in its Protestantism;
France had an absolutist monarchy, so Britain reveled in its constitutional monarchy.
This oppositional identity even extended to the form of Britain’s empire. Britons felt
that their “Empire of the Deep,” a phrase coined by the Scottish poet James Thomson,
was more civilized and thus morally superior to the traditional land empires of

4
5

Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 368
Ibid
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continental Europe.6 These two pillars – the Empire and separation from Europe –
defined the British nation for centuries, but they could not last forever. Though Britain
escaped from World War II physically unscathed compared to the rest of Europe, the
war was not so merciful to British national identity.
The United Kingdom’s total war against Nazi Germany marked the British
Empire’s final stand. To some extent, World War II was a war of choice for the UK.
Hitler held the Anglo-Saxon race in high esteem and sought to coexist with Britain, not
conquer it. The British Empire could likely have endured for some time longer if it had
decided to play along with Nazi Germany. It was a genuine and tempting option, but
Britain turned it down. As A. J. P. Taylor remarked in English History 1914-1945, the
decision to replace Neville Chamberlain with Winston Churchill in 1940 signified the
government’s conscious decision to defeat Hitler at any cost to Britain. “Victory,” Taylor
writes, “even if this meant placing the British empire in pawn to the United States;
victory, even if it meant Soviet domination of Europe; victory at all costs.”7 Britain,
then, was willing to bargain its empire - its function in the world and thus its very
identity - in exchange for defeating Germany. It got exactly what it bargained for.
Rather than embrace the opportunities of an unknown future, in the wake of the
war Britons filled the void left by the loss of their Empire with a new myth. The “Finest
Hour” myth of World War II, rooted in the rhetoric of Winston Churchill, loomed large
in the British imagination. The myth still holds power to this day, though less than it
did in the two decades after the war. In fact, it may have been most purely expressed as

Stephen H. Gregg (ed.), Empire and Identity: An Eighteenth-Century Sourcebook, (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005), p. 7
7 A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 475
6
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recently as 2005 in an episode of the British pop-cultural institution Doctor Who.
Visiting London during the Blitz, the Doctor – a time-travelling alien with a distinctly
British spirit – rhapsodizes:
Amazing… 1941. Right now, not very far from here, the German war machine is rolling
up the map of Europe. Country after country, falling like dominoes. Nothing can stop it.
Nothing! Until one tiny, damp little island says, “No! No. Not here.” A mouse in front
of a lion. You’re amazing. The lot of you. Don’t know what you do to Hitler, but you
frighten the hell out of me.8

In redefining their nation as the mouse that defeated the lion, a complete reversal of
Britain’s representation during the age of the Empire, Britons were able to maintain
their belief in the supremacy of the United Kingdom despite a broken empire and
waning international influence. They replaced the sprawl of the Empire with a fierce
pride in their tiny island that stood tall where larger nations fell. The sun may finally
have set on the British Empire, but if Britons’ stiff upper lip saw them through the fury
of Hitler, it could similarly see them through any trial. Britons became convinced of
their self-reliance and wary of tying themselves to any foreign nation or international
organization that they did not absolutely control. The “Finest Hour” myth effectively
gave Britons a reprieve from having to grapple with the hard question of determining
who they would be in a post-Empire world and compelled them to prove their
continuing independence.
Their primary tool in this endeavor was the Commonwealth. Britain’s trade was
by choice dependent on the Commonwealth states – a collection of former colonies that
still maintained a free association under the Crown. The Commonwealth was born out
of a desire to accommodate colonial calls for independence and international pressure
8

Stephen Moffat, Doctor Who, “The Empty Child,” 2005
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to end colonial practices without losing the material benefits of the Empire or the sense
of fraternity that Britons felt toward the residents of their former colonies. Britain
granted the Commonwealth states independence in exchange for continued symbolic
ties and – more importantly – privileged trade agreements. Of these states, Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa were most important to the British economy.
The Commonwealth states, however, were growing less dependent on Britain by
the year. Independently, they all began to realize that trade with the world’s growing
economies – particularly the United States, Germany, and Japan – was too lucrative to
turn down. They opened their markets to more non-British goods and decreased the
proportion of their exports that went to Britain.9 Britain’s primary export market was
shrinking fast, and it did not aggressively pursue new markets to compensate. Britain
was failing, and it would continue on its downward spiral as long as it remained
convinced that it could go it alone.
The EEC was the primary alternative to continued reliance on the
Commonwealth, but by joining with Europe Britain would be destroying the only pillar
of its national identity that still stood. After the loss of the Empire, Britain’s cultural
separation from the rest of Europe was as important to its national identity as ever. For
Britons clinging to the myth of their global uniqueness, it was all they had left. World
War II further reinforced this narrative by convincing Britons that they had saved
Europe from Hitler, and therefore that the Continent was in Britain’s debt. As such, the
notion of joining the EEC was tantamount to destroying the last tenet of traditional
British national identity. Without the EEC, however, Britain’s future looked bleak.

9

William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), p. 223
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At this historic juncture, with Britons coming to terms with an old identity lost
but fighting against the only plausible vision of their future tooth and nail, I begin this
thesis.
Historiographical Discussion
British political history is traditionally biographical, and as such usually reflects
some variation of the “Great Man” theory of history. Even the broad surveys, such as A.
J. P. Taylor’s above-mentioned English History 1914-1945, are generally framed as the
story of a series of great individuals and the ways in which they shaped Britain. In these
accounts, social forces and national identity are subservient to the men, and
occasionally the women, who wielded them. There is a healthy body of British social
and cultural history, but it is kept in a separate sphere from the political. The two are
rarely allowed to interact or inform one another in British historiography.
Studies that focus on Britain’s entry into the EEC follow this trend. Most of the
scholarship on this period comes from two authors: Helen Parr and Melissa Pine.
Melissa Pine’s work Harold Wilson and Europe begins with De Gaulle’s veto of Britain’s
1967 EEC application and argues that Wilson should be credited with laying the
groundwork for Britain’s successful bid in 1972, though it took place during MacMillan’s
premiership. Helen Parr’s book Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community
more directly overlaps with the first half of this study. It focuses on Wilson’s dealings
with his Cabinet and the European leaders – particularly De Gaulle – from 1964 to 1967
and argues that Wilson supported the EEC out of a genuine belief in its ideals, not a sly
political calculus as is often argued. These two authors came together to write an essay
in The Labour Governments 1964-1970 called “Policy Towards the European Economic
18

Community,” which acts as a summary and synthesis of their books. The works of Pine
and Parr have two primary items on their agenda: they establish a detailed chronology
of events at the highest level of government, and they seek to intervene in Harold
Wilson’s reputation by showing him to be as dedicated an idealist as he was a canny
politician. These are valid concerns, but they have already been addressed and as such
will not play a major role here.
Rather, this thesis aims to complicate the story of British political history by
adding in issues of national identity, historical memory, and public opinion. Wilson’s
actions will be equally balanced with the words of average Britons in order to show the
discourse between the halls of power and the politics of the people. National identity
constrains the choices available to policymakers, and though elites can influence that
identity, it ultimately lives in the public. Politics informs public perception, and public
perception shapes politics. This thesis shows by example that to tell the history of one
without the other is to tell an incomplete story.
Methodology
In researching this study, I relied on two bodies of primary sources in addition to
secondary studies and the memoirs of Harold Wilson. The first of these is the vast
quantity of British governmental records available to the public. The Hansard Project
collects Parliamentary papers and complete transcripts of every Parliamentary debate
from 1803 to 2005. The British National Archives publishes the Cabinet Papers of the
government as they are declassified, which by law is thirty years after they were created.
All of these sources have been consulted in compiling this thesis.
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The second body of sources used – representing the bulk of this study’s original
research – is a collection of regional newspapers from throughout Great Britain. This
thesis uses the “Letters to the Editor” sections of these papers as a window into the
public debate surrounding the EEC in Britain. Historians constantly struggle with
accurately assessing the views of the majority of people who do not control the historical
narrative. In more modern times the printing press, and now the internet, have made it
easier for non-elites to record, distribute, and preserve their words. That said, tuning
into the voice of the street is still a challenge. Newspapers that publish letters to the
editor are one of the only sources in which the original words of common Britons are
preserved in a large volume. As such, this thesis uses them as its primary tool for
tapping into public discourse.
The newspapers examined in this thesis were carefully selected in order to
provide a wide range of public opinion. They were chosen according to two criteria:
geographic variance and political orientation. They represent a sampling of regions
from around the United Kingdom and include papers aligned with various points on the
political spectrum in order to account for editorial bias in which letters were selected for
publication in various papers.10
Thesis Structure
This thesis begins by exploring Harold Wilson’s shift in opinion on the EEC
during his first three years as Prime Minister (1964-1967). It argues that Wilson’s
The following newspapers were primarily used: The Birmingham Post (serving the West Midlands
area, free market orientation); The Bristol Evening Post (serving Greater Bristol, Northern Somerset, and
South Gloucestershire, centrist/independent orientation); The Express & Star (serving Wolverhampton
and the Black Country, Liberal orientation); The Liverpool Daily Post (serving Liverpool, Merseyside,
Cheshire, and North Wales, center-left orientation); and the Manchester Evening News (serving Greater
Manchester, leftist orientation).
10
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reversal, from opponent of the EEC to its greatest champion, was the result of a
pragmatic economic calculus, but that his public argument for EEC membership was
rooted in British history and national identity. This reflected his deep understanding of
how the public would view the EEC as a challenge to British identity, though he himself
viewed the issue in economic terms. Wilson sought to steer Britain toward a new
identity as the industrial and technological heart of an integrated Europe. The British
public, however, was not yet ready to follow him down that path.
From there it examines the 1967 EEC debate in public discourse. It uses the
words of common Britons to construct a snapshot of Britain’s “Finest Hour” ideology at
the height of its influence and argues that Britain’s World War II identity suffered a
Pyrrhic victory in 1967. It held strong in the face of an event that undermined its
primary tenets – the application the EEC – but would never again possess the iron grip
that it once held over British society.
It next jumps forward to 1975 and focuses on the process that led to the 1975
national referendum on remaining in the EEC. Here it argues that Wilson consented to
the referendum in order to control his rebellious party, but that once the referendum
was underway he embraced it as an assertion of the will of the people over
Parliamentary Sovereignty. Thus, the referendum was framed as the moment in which
Britons were finally forced to conclusively decide on a new direction and a new identity.
Finally, it returns to the public discourse, but finds that in 1975 Britons had
largely shaken off the constraints of the “Finest Hour” narrative and were prepared to
step into an unknown future. The same anti-EEC arguments from 1967 were once again
rallied, but this time there were counter-arguments that revealed Britons writing a new
21

narrative of their history. By marshaling their history, Britons forged an alternate
national identity.
_________________________________
This thesis does not argue that British identity forever purged itself of the scars of
World War II in 1975 or that it permanently shifted toward Europe. Recent events in
the European Union – and current British public opinion about that troubled institution
– clearly show otherwise. Rather, in contrasting the 1967 EEC debate with the 1975
referendum, I aim to demonstrate that though casting off the relentless weight of history
is an excruciating process for a nation to undertake, and though it may not last for long,
it is possible. National identities are not set in stone. They change, and they can be
changed. Between 1967 and 1975, Britons showed the world how that can be done.
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Chapter One
The Two Wilsons: Harold Wilson and the 1967 EEC Application
We are not entitled to sell our friends and kinsmen down the river for a problematical and
marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf.
-Harold Wilson, August 3, 19611
…if the nineteenth century, the age of nationalism, the age of European liberalism, was
illuminated by the heroism and statesmanship which created those great nation States, the
twentieth century equally can go down in history as the age in which men had the vision, out
of those nation States, out of the destruction of two world wars which themselves arose from
conflicts of European nationalism, to create a new unity.
-Harold Wilson, May 8, 19672
__________________________________

Between 1961 and 1967, Harold Wilson transformed from a strong opponent of
the European Community into a Prime Minister who used the full weight of his title and
political prowess to persuade Parliament to apply for British entry into that same
Community. The two quotes above, separated by six years but both occurring in
Parliamentary debates on the EEC, hold the key to understanding that transformation.
In 1961, Wilson was droll and snappy. In dismissing the EEC with a short punch line,
his message was clear: “Britain does not need Europe.” In 1967, however, the message
and the tone were much different. The EEC, previously equated with washing machines,
was now the catalyst for transformative political change in Europe. The tone shifted
from down-to-earth, insular, and pithy to soaring, broad, and rather long-winded.3
Taken together, those two quotes evince more than a simple change of heart on a policy
issue; they indicate a calculated decision to change not just his conclusion, but the
fundamental way that he talked about the EEC question. This chapter explores that
conversion and argues that it foreshadowed the shift in British identity that eventually
Hansard, vol. 645, 3 August 1961, col. 1665.
Hansard, vol. 746, 8 May 1967, col. 1097
3 Though “long-winded” seems critical, Wilson would most likely agree. He began that same speech by
apologizing for its length and lamenting that it approaches “Gladstonian dimensions.”
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asserted itself in the 1975 referendum. Wilson’s shift, however, occurred well before
Britain’s. It began shortly after he ascended to Premiership in 1964.
Harold Wilson
Harold Wilson was born in 1916 to a politically active lower middle-class family.
His great-grandfather was a village cobbler, his grandfather was a Workhouse Master in
York, and his father was an industrial chemist who witnessed the birth of the Labour
Party in Manchester and voted for Labour in the party’s first major election in 1906; his
mother was a schoolteacher.4 As such, Wilson’s family was middle-class but had deep
roots in the working class. This shaped his view of how British society should operate.
In his memoirs, he wrote that his first experience in London – working as a research
statistician in the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee in 1940 – made him
uncomfortable. “I had brought with me a healthy set of provincial prejudices that all the
real work was done in places like Yorkshire… and that London was the Wen where the
spivs were making all the profits at the workers’ expense,” Wilson wrote.5 He once
claimed to have begun thinking like a Socialist at seven years of age and never stopped. 6
Wilson may have cultivated his image as a London outsider and a voice of the working
class, but that image reflected his genuine view of Britain. It was no mere political
tactic.7
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Despite his lower middle-class roots, Wilson fought his way to a prestigious
education on the merits of his intellectual prowess. He attended Wirral Grammar
School for Boys, a state-run grammar school, and served as Head Boy. He excelled
there, particularly at history.8 He received a county grant and an exhibition to study at
Jesus College at Oxford, where he originally enrolled to study Modern History. Mid-way
through his education, however, he changed fields to Philosophy, Politics, and
Economics.9 Wilson was known as a hard worker and a first-rate student, with one of
his professors calling him “the most brilliant pupil he had ever encountered.”10 Though
he was an Oxford student, the fact that he came to the school from a lower middle-class
family without money or connections helped him to avoid being lumped in with the
posh “Oxbridge” circle in the eyes of Britons.
Wilson’s experience in World War II established him as an experienced
bureaucrat and a skilled statistician – two descriptors that came to define his political
persona. When the Second World War broke out, Wilson enlisted in the Armed Forces
but was instead deemed a “specialist” and drafted into the Civil Service. During the war
he jumped between the Ministry of Supply, the economics section of the War Cabinet
Secretariat, the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Fuel and Power.11 At all of them,
Wilson served as an economic advisor and statistician. He played a key role in what
Lord William Beveridge, the influential British economist (and Wilson’s mentor at
Oxford) who formulated the post-war British welfare state, called “the Other War”: the
mass mobilization of the home front in order to produce a dedicated wartime
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economy.12 In these years, Wilson gained a reputation as a gifted economist with a mind
for statistics and a clever tactician. Having never served in the Armed Forces, however,
Wilson did not gain the clout of the war hero that characterized many of his peers.
Perhaps for this reason, he rarely evoked World War II as a political device while his
rivals – largely veterans – mentioned it constantly. He was seen as what modern
political observers would call a technocrat - a brilliant, scientifically-minded specialist
who was devoid of the burly charisma of someone like Winston Churchill. He rose to
prominence on the merits of his talent for micromanagement and his love of numbers,
not his bravado.
Shortly after the war, Wilson decided to leave the bureaucratic world behind and
run for Parliament. He was elected as Member of Parliament for Ormskirk in 1945 and
quickly rose up the ranks of the Labour Party. He became President of the Board of
Trade at the age of 31, marking him as the youngest British Cabinet member in the 20th
Century. In 1963, Labour’s candidate for Prime Minister – Hugh Gaitskell – was
unexpectedly killed by the vicious autoimmune disease Lupus, and Wilson became
Labour’s new nominee after a chaotic four-way contest. Wilson was thrust into the
spotlight, where he remained until his retirement from politics. His reputation as a
technocrat, however, was cemented during World War II and never swayed. That
reputation was well-earned; his love for statistics and his cold pragmatism were always
present in his political style, never more so than in his approach to the European
Economic Community.

12

Gerard Eyre Noel, p. 42

26

Wilson’s Economic Calculus (1961-66)
Until becoming Prime Minister, Harold Wilson viewed the EEC through an
economic lens. It would be a misleading simplification of Wilson’s position before 1964
to argue that he was wholly opposed to Britain joining the EEC on principle; rather, he
supported the EEC in principle, but remained opposed to joining due to the specifics of
the EEC’s economic program. At a Parliamentary debate in 1961, Wilson identified his
primary objection to EEC membership as the damage that it would do to trade with the
Commonwealth and with other countries outside the EEC. He expressed specific
concern over the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, meat and butter import agreements
with New Zealand, and other “tropical agricultural products.”13 Britain’s EEC
negotiators had thus far been unable to secure guarantees that the UK would be allowed
to maintain these trade agreements after joining the EEC. To Wilson, abandoning
Commonwealth trade would be a double crime. It would cripple the small
Commonwealth nations that relied on Britain to absorb much of their exports –
particularly New Zealand, which in 1965-66 sent 45% of its total exports to the UK.14 It
would also damage Britain, which in 1960 was still selling about 30% of its exports to
the Commonwealth and only 15.9% to Europe.15 Wilson felt that the numbers spoke for
themselves. Why abandon the larger trading bloc in favor of the smaller?
Even when opposed to joining the EEC, Wilson was entirely unmoved by the
argument that the EEC would infringe on British sovereignty. In fact, he welcomed such
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an eventuality. “The whole history of political progress is a history of gradual
abandonment of national sovereignty,” he told Parliament later in the same 1961 debate.
“We abrogate it when we have a French referee at Twickenham.”16 Wilson deployed the
same tactic here as in his “washing machines” comment: using a vivid folksy image to
belittle his opponent’s position. Here, however, he was aiming to nullify an argument
made by his own side. He was opposed to the EEC, but for specific economic reasons.
He had no patience for broader political arguments.
Wilson’s laser-like focus on the economic aspects of the EEC speaks to the depth
of his pragmatism. Wilson was no ideologue. He believed that history was moving in
the direction of European – and eventually world – integration, but grand historical
progress was less important to him than making sure that Britain could still import
butter from New Zealand at low rates. When taking this pragmatism into account, one
is inclined to agree with English historian Helen Parr’s conclusion that Wilson’s position
on the EEC never really changed.17 It was from the start attuned to an economicallyminded cost-benefit analysis. When circumstances changed, Wilson’s analysis changed
with it.
By the time that Wilson became Prime Minister, circumstances had indeed
changed. The EEC states were in the midst of a boom while Commonwealth trade was
becoming less and less lucrative. France and Germany in particular were experiencing
economic growth at a rate that significantly outpaced Britain’s. Between 1950 and 1960,
France increased both its imports and exports threefold while Germany increased its
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imports fourfold and its exports sixfold.18 Other indicators made clear that Europe
showed no signs of slowing down. For example, between 1960 and 1966, the number of
automobiles in France doubled from 5.5 million to 11 million.19 Most important from
Britain’s perspective, however, was how much of Europe’s success seemed to be due to
the EEC. Throughout the 1960s, just over a third of the EEC’s imports and exports were
flowing between EEC member states.20 Such self-reliance had considerable appeal to
Britain, an island country that was and is dependent on trade to survive. The EEC was
establishing a successful track record.
Meanwhile, British trade with the Commonwealth was waning – a fact that
juxtaposed with success of the surging EEC. By 1965, trade with the four most robust
Commonwealth nations – Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada – had
fallen to 18.7% of British exports.21 That same year, the six EEC states eclipsed the
Commonwealth as the largest market for British goods.22 Commonwealth trade was not
only losing ground in sheer volume; it was becoming far less lucrative. Between 1955
and 1965, trade with the Commonwealth grew at a dramatically slower rate than British
trade with the rest of the world. In that decade, the value of exports to the
Commonwealth grew by 11.5% and imports grew by 10.5%. In the same period, the
value of British exports to the rest of the world grew by 93%, imports by 69%.23
Furthermore, the Commonwealth nations were becoming progressively less reliant on
the UK for trade. Canada, for example, saw its trade with Japan quadruple and its trade
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with Germany triple in the 1955-65 decade. Its trade with the UK increased by only
50%.24 By establishing closer commercial ties with other nations, the Commonwealth
states were losing their incentive to give Britain such privileged trading status. The
system looked unsustainable.
In 1960, the UK helped establish the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as
an alternative to the EEC. It was envisioned as a simple free trade area that would allow
European states wary of the EEC’s implicit goal of eventual political unity to experience
some of the same economic benefits of closer trading ties. By 1967, the EFTA consisted
of seven full members: the UK, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Portugal, and
Austria. The organization, however, was not as lucrative as the British government had
hoped. The EEC was fueled by the industrial might of Germany married with the
agriculture of France. Without any comparable powerhouses in its ranks, the EFTA
never approached self-sufficiency.
Harold Wilson, stepping into this changing environment as Prime Minister, saw
that Britain’s economy no longer stood on firm feet. If Britain stubbornly maintained its
current course, it would continue to slip into international irrelevance. It needed a new
trade foundation fit for the modern world. Wilson’s cost/benefit analysis, unchanged in
its parameters since before he took office, now swung in the direction of the need for a
new economic arrangement and the EEC was the most obvious contender. In deciding
to explore the possibility of the EEC, however, Wilson was faced with a Cabinet, a Party,
and a nation driven by much more than economic calculus. What Wilson viewed as
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economic, most Britons viewed as political. If he wished to persuade his nation to join
with Europe, he would have to adjust accordingly.
The Two Wilsons (1966-67)
Between 1965 and 1967, Harold Wilson committed himself and his government
to make a second application to the European Economic Community, and in doing so
discussed the EEC in terms of British identity for the first time. There were, in effect,
two Harold Wilsons. The private Harold Wilson was concerned solely with the
economic calculus of EEC membership. This Wilson ordered the creation of a series of
long, complex studies of the EEC. One such study, marked SECRET GUARD and
distributed to his Cabinet Ministers, was an elaborate 30-page analysis of possible
alternatives to joining the EEC. It identified two such possibilities: continued
abstention from any global communities aside from the Commonwealth and the
creation of an Atlantic Free Trade Area (AFTA).
On the subject of abstention, the committee’s hopes were dim. In the cover letter
of the report, Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend summarized the committee’s jargon-filled
findings in plainer language, contending that it would be impossible to maintain
Britain’s current standard of living without entering the EEC. “In form we might be
more free,” he wrote, “but it would be a freedom to submit to disagreeable necessities.”25
Joining the EEC, the report concluded, was Britain’s only avenue of maintaining
international economic relevance.
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AFTA was favored by British Ministers across the political spectrum for years, but
was dismissed as a pipe dream by the interdepartmental committee tasked with
assessing its viability. A free trade agreement between the US and the UK, AFTA would
have effectively moved the British Isles across the Atlantic and away from Europe. The
Cabinet report, however, concluded that it “could only come into being as a result of
major changes in US policy, and perhaps only following US initiatives.”26 Trend’s cover
letter was even more damning. “There is no possibility of an AFTA coming into being
with the world economic order as it is now,” he wrote. “Decisions about future
economic strategy for the United Kingdom must be taken in the context of what is
possible now: and at present AFTA is not an ‘option’ open to the United Kingdom.” 27
Trend and the committee that wrote the report were aware of how important the EEC
was to the United States’ vision of a unified Europe as a bolster against communist
spread. The EEC was seen in the US as one of the most important engines behind
European recovery and continued strength, and a strong Europe meant that the US
could continue to roll back its economic support of the region. The US had no reason to
support a rival program to the EEC, and every interest in making that bloc even stronger
by promoting British entry.
Dense analytical reports such as this were the private Harold Wilson’s bread and
butter. Wilson later wrote in his memoir that after reading exactly such a report, “the
case for applying to join EEC had been strengthened in [his] mind.”28 Wilson’s memoir
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focuses on portraying him as unchanging in his commitment to EEC since taking office
in 1964. Tellingly, this brief line is the closest he comes to admitting to changing his
mind on the subject in the entire book. To the private Wilson, everything came down to
numbers. This was the Wilson who gained a reputation as a brilliant statistician in
World War II and who carried that reputation ever since.
In stark contrast, the second Wilson- the public Wilson – was focused almost
exclusively on the politics of the EEC. In speeches, he was keen on, as he put it, taking
“excursion[s] into history.”29 In these soliloquys, he began with the birth of the
European nation-state and posited a forward progression of history: “not the negative
concept of a retreat from imperialism, but the forward move from Empire to
Commonwealth.”30 By Commonwealth, he meant a broad conception of international
unity and cooperation. As such, he framed EEC membership as an extension of the
international fraternity that Britons felt with the Commonwealth they already had.
European integration was the next inevitable phase of history. Britain could embrace it
or be left behind – and if it decided to embrace the EEC, it had to do so soon. The EEC
was a moving target that had been evolving since its inception. The longer Britain
waited to join, the longer its policies continued to evolve without British influence.
Wilson placed particular emphasis on arguing that Britain’s technological
prowess, if married with Europe’s vast markets, could allow the UK to return to its lost
place as the world’s technological capitol. In 1966, at the Prime Minister’s annual
speech at Guildhall – the City of London’s town hall – Wilson advocated for:
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…a drive to create a new technological community to pool within Europe the enormous
technological inventiveness of Britain and other European countries, to enable Europe,
on a competitive basis, to become more self-reliant… I can think of nothing that would
make a greater reality of the whole European concept. And in this field of technological
cooperation no one has more to contribute than Britain…31

In making such arguments, Wilson attempted to reframe the issue from Britain needing
Europe in order to remain relevant to Europe needing Britain in order to best realize its
long-term objectives. This tactic served twin purposes. First, it was a marketing ploy
aimed at Europe. By asserting Britain’s usefulness to the EEC, Wilson attempted to
create a better position for negotiating the UK’s terms of entry.32 Second, and more
important to this thesis, it also served as an appeal to British national identity. Britons
took immense pride in their nation’s history as the cradle of the industrial revolution.
At its peak, technological wizardry defined the Empire to Britons and to the world. This
sense of awe was perfectly captured by Jules Verne’s Around the World in Eighty Days,
a novel dedicated in large part to breathlessly describing the expanse of the British
Empire and the technology that enabled its success. Verne, as a Frenchman, showed
this from an outsider’s perspective though his protagonist Phileas Fogg was British.
Britain’s technological mastery, however, was not to last. The United States, spurred on
by its massive industrial expansion during World War II, replaced Great Britain as the
world’s technological mecca in the post-war era. That usurpation robbed Britain of a
key feature of its national identity. Wilson, by suggesting that EEC membership could
position Britain to become the technological center of Europe, offered Britons a chance
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to reclaim a prized title that had been lost. Wilson’s argument, however, looked
forward, not backward.
By pairing his technological argument with his “excursions into history,” Wilson
formulated a new British national identity rooted in carving out a unique and important
role for Britain as a component of Europe, not as an independent state. Britain could
once again become a technological powerhouse, but only by joining with Europe in “a
new unity.”33 According to Wilson’s narrative, Britain no longer had a place in the world
alone, but as a part of Europe it could once again taste international glory. Moreover, if
Britain resisted this new identity, it would be fighting the “forward move” of history.34
Britain, he argued, must swim with the tide.
This new public Wilson is difficult to reconcile with the technocrat who managed
Britain’s “Other War” during World War II. Historians may never be certain of the exact
reason for the sharp divide between the private Wilson and the public Wilson. His
memoirs are much too guarded. The public Wilson’s argument was a political tactic, as
are any arguments made by a politician. The question of how he became convinced that
his approach was the best possible tactic merits further investigation. 35 Nevertheless,
his argument was prescient regardless of how it was formulated.
Britons by and large did not take to Wilson’s narrative in 1967, but by the 1975
referendum it was the dominant mode of thinking. Wilson’s argument foreshadowed
the shift in British national identity that asserted itself in the 1975 referendum. In order
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to understand the full magnitude of that shift, however, one must first examine the
starting-point: British national identity as it existed in 1967.
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Chapter Two
Keep Calm and Carry On: The 1967 EEC Debate in Public Discourse
This is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do… For Britain’s story and her
interests lie far beyond the continent of Europe.
-Anthony Eden, 1952
__________________________________

Harold Wilson’s narrative of British history failed to translate into public
approval for EEC membership in 1967. While Britain’s major national newspapers were
full of economic jargon and interchangeable letters of support for EEC from Members of
Parliament, the country’s regional newspapers were flooded with a storm of letters
raging against membership. There were letters of support as well, but in the six regional
papers examined in this study the negative letters dramatically outnumbered the
positive. That is not to claim that all of British public opinion was opposed to EEC by
that same majority; angry people are more motivated to act than their happy
counterparts, resulting in an unavoidable bias toward angrier respondents in formats
such as Letters to the Editor. In addition, one can never rule out editorial bias in the
selection of which letters were published. Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the letters
sent, the rhetorical ferocity of so many of those letters, and the remarkable consistency
in themes between them regardless of geographic distribution indicates that passionate,
motivated opposition to EEC membership was widespread.
The letters, pro and con, all centered around three key themes in the EEC debate:
British pride, separation from continental Europe, and British cultural heritage. While
these themes are all uniquely recognizable, and for ease of analysis will be examined
separately, it will become apparent that they were not discrete but rather interacted and
37

intersected in important ways. Taken together, they create a thorough depiction of
British self-perception and identity as it stood in 1967. That the notion of joining the
EEC challenged all three of these pillars of identity goes a long way toward explaining
why it was such a fundamental affront to the way that so many Britons viewed their
nation and themselves.
British history was infused in all three of these themes, and the memory of
Britain’s experience during World War II was particularly pervasive. In 1967, the
British myth of World War II as the nation’s finest hour – the moment that Britain
saved the world from the forces of tyranny by standing up alone and refusing to give in
where the larger nations of Europe had all crumbled – was as powerful as ever. Britain
was the savior of Europe, the argument went. The thought of now asking help from
those weak nations that had rolled over to Hitler was a disgrace, let alone the thought of
going to Hitler’s nation itself. As a former member of the 8th Army disdainfully put the
issue, “Whatever happened to this country that we go sniveling to the people who, 25
years ago, were beholden to us for saving their country?”1 This question was implicit in
many of the letters from 1967. Thus, history – and particularly the narrative of British
history established by Winston Churchill – determined the framework through which
Britons understood the EEC. In 1967, that framework showed no signs of loosening.
History was a barrier that could not yet be overcome. Instead, Britons decided to keep
calm and carry on just as they did in World War II, whatever the outcome.
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British Pride
The first and most fundamental theme exposed by Wilson’s EEC application was
what one correspondent to The Birmingham Post referred to as “the symbol British,”
but what could be more simply termed British national pride. The letter in question was
written by C. J. Gorhmann of Hall Green and was published by the Post on May 9, 1967
under the header “Britain and the ‘Six’ – a question of loyalties.” Gorhmann used
sweeping language, referring to the EEC issue as “the sword of Damocles,” forever
hanging over the heads of the British people. He used the metaphor of the dog that had
a bone, but saw a larger one reflected in the water in front of him. The dog dropped his
bone in the water to get the reflection, but ended up with no bone at all. Gorhmann
implied that such would be the case if Britain abandoned the Commonwealth in favor of
Europe. But despite Gorhmann’s vivid figurative language, his letter was most revealing
when at its bluntest: “We are tired of the humiliation that the once mighty British
should go, cap in hand, to European heads with the appeal, ‘Please can we come in?’…
Let the symbol British once again mean something in the world.”2 To Gorhmann,
British national pride was at an all-time low, and joining with Europe would only
damage it further by taking away Britain’s last semblance of independence.
Gorhmann’s letter is one of the clearest illustrations of a connection that
constantly recurred in the public opinion of 1967: the link between Britain’s level of
international respect and the self-respect of the British people. It is essential to realize
just how personal this link was. For many Britons in 1967, the reputation of their nation
was not simply tied to some vague notion of collective patriotism; Britain was their daily
C. J. Gorhmann, Hall Green, Birmingham 28. “Britain and the ‘Six’ – a question of loyalties,” The
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source of motivation and self-esteem. “What man ever did his best when his personal
pride had been taken from him?” asked A. M. Gidman of Manchester. “The same is true
of a nation. We are being stripped of everything we had pride in. How shall we put
forth all the efforts we are told we should, and why?”3 To Mrs. Gidman and many like
her, the symbol British – the idea that Britain was not just another country among many
but the lion that steered the world – was a vital part of the fabric of their lives. Gidman’s
words evoked depression. She questioned not just how she could overcome the
challenges of the future, but what the effort would even be for if Britons no longer held
pride in their nation. She derived self-worth from her nation’s reputation.
For many, the modern sources of British national pride were Britain’s role in
World War II and the Commonwealth. Churchill’s “Finest Hour” narrative created a
distinct superiority complex in the British national psyche – by “saving” Europe, Britain
had established itself as in a different league than the Continent. This post-war
superiority complex in turn magnified the importance of the Commonwealth to Britons
everywhere. “S,” an ex-Eighth Army and Intelligence Service member, illustrated this
dynamic in the clearest terms possible in the pages of the Manchester Evening News.
“In 1940, this country had a moment of truth,” S writes. “Among the few friends we had
were the Canadians, the Australians, and New Zealanders. They were with us to the
death… We should stick to our friends, our real friends, the tried and true… And those
real friends are not in Europe. They never have been and they never will be.”4 To
Britain, the Commonwealth allies stayed in the fight to the bitter end, where the
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European nations that the Government now sought to join either rolled over or were the
source of the cataclysm.
Of course, the reason that the Commonwealth nations did not succumb to Nazi
Germany was the very fact that they were not a part of Europe. It had little to do with
their natural fortitude or unwavering loyalty; Hitler had enough on his plate on his own
continent. Nevertheless, to the British the Commonwealth had succeeded where Europe
had failed, and as such earned Britain’s loyalty now that the war was over. The thought
of abandoning the Commonwealth in favor of Europe was viewed by many as nothing
less than spitting in the face of Britain’s heritage. As S concluded, “anything that
weaken[s] the ties between Britain and her kith and kin… is bad, dangerously bad,
morally bad, infamously bad.”
In the view of Britons, the Commonwealth nations took on a somewhat
contradictory character. They were the brave few that stood with Britain, but they were
also spoken of as children in need of guidance. “Before our eyes stretches the
consortium of nations which we created and which, for seven years has been sadly
neglected – crying out for leadership in this bewildering world!” wrote P.H.5 This
paternalistic tone is pervasive in the way that Britons spoke of the Commonwealth in the
1967 EEC debate. In a different letter, the same P.H. brought the subtext front and
center: “May 11, 1967: one of the great dates in history. The day when Britain gave up
her role as ‘Mother’ of a group of nations embracing a quarter of the world…”6 Britain’s
relationship to the Commonwealth was a powerful cocktail, then – Britain
simultaneously viewed itself as both mother and comrade-in-arms, to say nothing of the
5
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Commonwealth’s immense symbolic value as the last living vestige of the once-mighty
British Empire.
The Commonwealth was used as the basis for the primary counterproposal to
EEC entry: an expanded free trade zone consisting of the Commonwealth, the EFTA
nations, and in some proposals the United States. As discussed in Chapter 1, Wilson
and his cabinet examined this proposal in great detail, but no matter the angle
concluded that it was economically unsound. To the public, however, the debate was
driven more by emotion than analysis.
Take, for example, a letter from Mrs. L. H. Midwinter. After supporting the free
trade zone consisting of the Commonwealth and EFTA states, she wrote: “Surely we are
more akin to them than to the French – who let us down in the war, and to the Germans
whose wartime crimes against humanity will never be forgotten.”7 Or, for an angrier
opinion, there was F.J.M. of Timperley. To F.J.M., British politicians “frittered away the
Empire… Had our heritage been managed properly we could have had our own worldwide common market.” Right on cue, F.J.M. concluded by once again bringing it back
to World War II with gusto: “Dr. Goebbels’ main ambition during the last war was to
see Britain ‘a forgotten little island lost in the mists of the North Sea.’ Our politicians
are doing the job for him.”8
Britons’ emotional ties to the Commonwealth, dramatically enhanced by the
experience of World War II, were so overwhelming that in one remarkable letter they
even served as an argument against analytical evaluation. Defending the
L. H. Midwinter (Mrs), Cemlyn Park, Penmaenmawr, “Why so eager?” Liverpool Daily Post, May 22,
1967, Letters to the Editor
8 F.J.M., Timberley, “Sold out,” Manchester Evening News, May 9, 1967, Postbag
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Commonwealth-EFTA free trade zone against (accurate) claims that it was statistically
unfeasible, this correspondent wrote: “Thank goodness that staticians [sic] were
overruled in 1939. Facts and figures (and computers) would have proved that it was
impossible for us to win the war, and by now, those of us who were not exterminated
would all be good little Nazis.” 9 This reference to statisticians can be read as a slight
against Harold Wilson, who served as a statistician during the war. The writer
concludes by urging politicians to trust in “the spirit of the British people” to overcome
any challenge. The spirit of the British people, however, was in many ways built on the
values of logic and reason. Britain’s rise to glory stemmed from its status as the heart of
the industrial revolution. Its cultural icons were men such as Charles Darwin and Isaac
Newton, its foremost literary hero Sherlock Holmes – all symbols of the power of
science and logic. But such was the power of the Commonwealth when infused with the
battle scars of World War II – it was enough to convince many Britons that blood was
thicker than reason.
The extent to which British national pride colored the ins and outs of everyday
life for many is seen in a letter from S. D. of South Reddish. S. D. claimed to have never
purchased any textile goods of foreign manufacture in his/her life in an effort to remain
true to the Queen. The writer worries, however, that after joining the ECC such a
British-only policy will no longer be possible, what with the Continent “poised ready to
flood this country with their own goods, but not for our benefit!”10 While S. D.’s
particular expression of pride may have been eccentric, it speaks to the concrete power
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of British national pride in the ways that Britons lived their lives. And just as poor S. D.
feared, that pride was fading.
Britain’s fall from eminence was a process that began well before Harold Wilson
decided to apply to the EEC. Nevertheless, to many Britons the possibility of joining the
EEC was the source of Britain’s fall, not a response to it. A reader of the Birmingham
Post wrote that because of the decision to join Europe, “the damage is done… in the eyes
of the world Britain is now finished as a great nation.”11 A correspondent identified only
as “Patriot” concurred in one of the grimmest letters of the debate:
Where is our national pride? …It is high time that the peoples of these isles aroused
themselves from their torpor and realised that what Philip of Spain, Napoleon of France,
the Kaiser and Hitler of Germany could not accomplish by force is about to be realised by
European political dominance over Britain… Wake up, Britain, to the tremendous
implications involved, raise your voices in protest.12

T. S. Pursell drove the point home even further in the pages of Express & Star on May 3.
If Britain joins the ECC, Pursell wrote, “…the lion’s roar would become a miserable
squeak. It would be a signal to sound the ‘last post’ and haul down the Union Jack. The
outside world would regard Britain as a third rate power and a spent force.”13 Taken
together, these letters illuminate a widespread, consistent logic. Britons derived a sense
of pride and purpose from their nation’s global status, which was under attack by the
looming threat of joining with Europe; therefore, the EEC directly threatened to rob
Britons of their pride and their purpose. It was taken as a personal affront, and Britons
reacted accordingly.
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Opinions in favor of joining with Europe were fuelled by the same basic impulse.
The key difference in rhetoric, however, was the pro-Europe camp’s view of the EEC as a
bandage to an already-bleeding wound rather than a fresh injury. “On balance, and with
nostalgia, I am in favour of entry, as I should like to think that Great Britain will still be
a force to be reckoned with when my granddaughter reaches maturity,” opined Sutton
Coldfield’s E. T. Lea.14 Lea’s recognition of the “nostalgia” in her argument is a powerful
insight into the debate at large, not simply her contribution. Almost everyone in the
debate yearned for Britain to return to its days of glory, and almost everyone was
personally scarred by the decline of British national pride. The difference lay in
approach: should Britain return to the glory days by mimicking the behavior of the past,
or should it attempt to create a new glory day by forging a different future? For many,
the answer to that question was determined by the answer to another: were Britons
European?
Are We European?
The second thread that must be traced to understand the 1967 EEC debate is the
question of whether Britons considered themselves part of Europe or a separate entity.
The most revealing window into this question was an exchange of letters sent to The
Liverpool Daily Post in response to the Liverpool City Council’s decision to fly the
European Flag on May 5 as a symbol of approval for Wilson’s EEC decision. An article
published in the Daily Post described the outrage that many Liverpudlians expressed
over this decision. The first writer to respond to the article was John Rimmer, in favor
of the City Council’s decision. “The hysterical opposition… would lead one to think that
E. T. Lea, Boldmere Road, Sutton Coldfield, Untitled, The Birmingham Post, May 8 1967, Letters to the
Editor
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the Council had advocated federation with Luxembourg… We are a European nation by
history and geography… We should be proud of our place in Europe; not ashamed of it
in a display of insular chauvinism.”15
As Mr. Rimmer may have expected, the “hysterical opposition” that he
denounced was not content to sit quietly. “How can we be European,” J. R. Gradwell
asked, “when our language differs from any spoken on the Continent… and our legal and
Parliamentary systems are also very different?” On the subject of World War II,
Gradwell added that “we were only in a position to oppose Hitler because we were selfgoverning, and not a part of an amorphous ‘Europe.’”16 Gradwell identified himself in
the letter as the Secretary of the Merseyside Committee Anti-Common Market League.
A. Morris, replying three days later, took note of Gradwell’s affiliation. “Mr. Gradwell’s
society should be re-named ‘fuddy duddies,’” Morris wrote.17 That may be so, but
Gradwell’s Anti-Common Market League was no Liverpool anomaly. It was a national
organization with branches across Britain, primarily composed of Tories, that had
enough members and funding to organize door-to-door canvassing and pamphlets that
were mailed to houses nationwide on election years throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
Rimmer, the writer of the first letter, also responded to Gradwell’s rebuttal, though his
new letter was contained to a dry explication of the English language’s European roots. 18
This exchange shows that opinion on Britain’s identity as a European state – or
lack thereof – was split and passionately defended on both sides of the divide. That it
John Rimmer, Norgate Street, Liverpool 4, “We should be proud of being European,” The Liverpool
Daily Post, April 13, 1967, Letters to the Editor
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was kicked off by public uproar over the City Council’s flying of the European flag
indicates either that the balance was tilted more toward the anti-Europe camp, or that
that camp was much louder than their opposite numbers. But while this exchange was
the only time that the question of Britain’s place in Europe was directly confronted, the
language used by Britons in the debate – even those who supported joining the EEC –
points toward a consensus feeling that Britain and Europe were indeed naturally
separate entities. Take, for instance, L. Hyman’s letter to the Manchester Evening News
of May 3. “Surely we… have a right to some say in the matter as to whether we are
willing to give up our traditional independent way of life and to become partners with
people with whom we have very little in common.”19 This letter shares a common thread
with Pursell’s - joining with the EEC is perceived as the first step in the process of
European domination over Britain. This very idea indicates that in the minds of these
writers, Britain is indeed separate from Europe; otherwise the phrase “European
domination over Britain” would be meaningless. There is another issue that links these
letters together with many others as well. The EEC was not merely a threat to Britain’s
non-European identity, but also threatened to put an end to its noble heritage of
sovereignty and democracy.
British Heritage
British letter-writers in 1967 felt that by joining the EEC, Britain would be
abandoning its unique cultural heritage in exchange for amalgamation with a faceless
European bloc. In formulating their argument, they focused on two facets of British
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heritage: Britain’s history as a nation rooted in liberty and traditional British domestic
values.
The EEC presented a two-front attack on Britons’ conception of their
constitutional heritage. It was believed that the EEC would strip Parliament and the
Queen of their sovereignty and, in the memorable phrase of one self-proclaimed
“ordinary housewife,” transform England into “a nonentity.”20 But equally damaging to
Britain’s liberty in the eyes of many was Parliament’s decision to force Britain into the
EEC in the first place. There were numerous calls for a public referendum and
accusations of Parliamentary dictatorship. L. M. Hopkins, a reader of the Evening Post,
summed up the mood so well on May 2 that the subsequent week, the paper published
three opinions in praise of his letter. “The moment the Treaty was signed,” Hopkins
wrote, “the constitutional status of H. M. the Queen would be grievously impaired.
Seven hundred years of developing parliamentary government would be jeapardised…”
Hopkins went on to accuse the Government of being manipulated by “powerful vested
interests” and declared that “it would be nothing short of blatant dictatorship to apply
for entry without first arranging a national referendum.” 21
Hopkins’ cry was repeated in letters to newspapers across the country, often
accompanied by the refrain that the Government had “no mandate” for its actions.22
“Why should a handful of men in Parliament take it upon themselves to force a nation of
51M people into a position… which the vast majority of the people do not want?” asked
M. V. Passmore (Mrs), Cemlyn Park, Penmaenmawr, “What benefits,” Liverpool Daily Post, May 1,
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L. Hyman.23 In a letter from T. Jones, one can sense a feeling of betrayal and
exasperation: “I do not want it. Nor do millions of others. But what can we do? Who
can we vote for?”24 The rhetoric reached its venomous pinnacle in the hands of Mrs.
Stella Gentry of Bristol. “Like naughty children, those of us who reject our proposed
entry into the Common Market… are reprimanded for not knowing what is best for us.
‘Eat up your cabbage, it’s good for you!’ The same applies.”25 There are many, more
letters that cover the same ground, ranging from the down-to-earth language of Mrs.
Gentry to simple expressions of frustration as blunt as these words by an unnamed
writer from Salford: “Far too much power lies in the hands of too few… It’s time the
whole system was changed.”26 In all of these letters, the message is clear: Parliament
was acting against the will of the people and was throwing away Britain’s national
sovereignty; the people must be allowed to decide their own fate.
The prominence of calls for a national referendum and the derision of Parliament
for acting without one was a telling phenomenon. In 1967, there had never been a
national referendum in the United Kingdom. What these many letter-writers were
asking for was unprecedented. That a referendum on the EEC would be viewed as a
right of the British people – that Parliament would be accused of dictatorship in a
country where Parliament, not the people, was sovereign –reflected Britons’ deeply held
myth of their country as a progenitor and bastion of liberty. A referendum would itself
be an infringement of Parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, by demanding a referendum,
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Britons indicated that independence from Europe was a more important component of
their national identity than preserving Parliamentary sovereignty. Their heritage as an
abstract home for liberty was more important than the institutions through which that
liberty had traditionally been defended. In reaching these conclusions, Britons
subscribed to a particular narrative of their history – one in which Britain’s primary
defining feature was its separation from Europe. That narrative was rarely challenged in
1967; the weight of history was too great.
British heritage was also closely connected to the traditional domestic values
represented by the “ordinary housewife.” Traditional gender roles were being
challenged across the Western world in the second half of the 1960s, and for Britons
that change was linked to the fall of British national pride. The Empire had been the
defining fact of British life for generations – a source of stability. When that stability fell
away, it seemed as though nothing was sacred and nothing was safe. The reaction – as it
always is when the status quo is challenged – was to clamp down, hence the recurring
focus on the simple British housewife that was so often used as a counterpoint to the
complicated techno-jargon and fast-paced cosmopolitan drive of the pro-EEC forces. If
Britons could hold on to their traditional domestic way of life, perhaps they could hold
on to the spirit of the Empire as well.
We have already met one such “ordinary housewife,” but she was far from the
only person to identify herself as such. In fact, the phrase “ordinary housewife” served
as a powerful recurring symbol for British domestic traditions in the 1967 debate. It was
used by men, but more often it was used by women who self-identified as ordinary
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housewives to signal their detachment from the lofty, philosophical side of the debate
and their interest in more material concerns.
A letter from M. V. Passmore of Penmaenmawr, the same housewife mentioned
earlier, acted as an early template for similar letters to come. On May 1, she wrote to the
Liverpool Daily Post: “Will someone please tell an ordinary housewife just what are the
benefits we may expect if we join the Common Market? …It is said that butter would
cost 8s a pound, and the Sunday joint two or three times its present price. Exactly what
are the benefits?”27 D. G. Hulin made the same argument in Bristol: “If every housewife
were made aware of the increased cost of food alone I am sure the majority would vote
against entry.”28 And Mrs. Beedell, also of Bristol, agreed: “Does the housewife realise
what [Common Market entry] will mean? It is going to make some weekly pay packets
look pretty sick.”29 Mrs. Williams of Clevedon brought it home: “We shall just have to
lower our standard of living which, with two children to bring up, is not what we
expected to have to do.”30
The main concern in all of these letters is the increase in the cost of living that
was predicted upon entry into the EEC – a concern shared in dozens of other letters –
but the specific focus on the housewife in these letters and others is notable. The
housewife was not just a symbol of the simple, traditional way of British living; she
evoked the glory days of the Empire. The world was rapidly changing in the 1960s – the
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EEC threatening to bring yet more change – but in these letters one could never tell that
the domestic life of Britons which formed an essential part of their national identity had
budged an inch in the last century.
Weaving the Threads Together: British National Identity in the 1967 Debate
This chapter has traced three threads of argument in the 1967 EEC debate: the
dwindling of British national pride, the question of whether Britain was a European
state or an entity of its own, and the uniqueness of Britain’s cultural heritage. All three
of these threads were built on the same foundation: a particular narrative of British
history that posited that Britons were preordained to lead the world, and that if they
were not fulfilling that role, they were not fulfilling their destiny. When one steps back,
these threads are revealed to form a tightly-knit fabric that composes a comprehensive
portrait of British identity in 1967.
The legacy of World War II not only reinforced ties to the Commonwealth in the
minds of Britons – it gave them something new to be proud of just as they lost the
Empire, their old source of national pride. The narrative of World War II as Britain’s
“finest hour” convinced Britons that their golden age was recent enough to be within
reach. Rather than viewing the decline of the British Empire as the gradual process that
it was, the heroic narrative of World War II made it seem as though Britain went from
riches to rags in a mere twenty years. It kept Britons in denial for decades; the move
toward the European Community was consequently felt as a violent upheaval and
disillusionment rather than the culmination of a gradual shift. The rhetoric of the age
reflects that feeling. The rug was being pulled out from under the British people.
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Similarly, Britain’s heritage of liberty was an essential component of its identity.
Much like the Commonwealth was viewed as the last vestige of the British Empire, the
notion of parliamentary republicanism and the sovereignty of the queen served as the
final wall in the fortress of British greatness. The Empire may have been gone, but as
long as Britain’s unique form of government remained intact, Britain would forever be a
special place on earth. At least Britons still had the Queen. The EEC threatened to
fundamentally challenge the British form of government, and with it strip away the last
layer of meaning of traditional British identity.
The British identity that had been in place for generations was challenged on
every front by the 1967 bid for entry into the EEC. It was an identity rooted in the
symbolic and material power of the British Empire. People across Britain derived
personal value from the Empire; they were raised with the narrative that the Empire
made them unique and gave their lives meaning. A long history of parliamentary
governance and a commitment to individual liberty was a strong component of the
Empire, as was an idealized vision of simple domestic living. World War II renewed the
narrative of British uniqueness for a new generation, convincing Britons that their
nation was different from the rest of Europe, putting up an invisible wall in the English
Channel between those who fell to Hitler and those who stood fast. It also added
potency to Britons’ feeling of connection to the Commonwealth states, who stood fast
with them. The possibility of joining the European Community posed a direct threat to
every one of these central tenets of British identity. Britons were left with a choice: fight
a futile battle to return to the past and effectively become Goebbels’ threatened “little
island lost in the mist,” or forge a new identity and adapt to the future. They could
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succumb to one narrative of their history, or they could rewrite that narrative and
reinvent their nation. In 1975, they chose the latter.
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Chapter Three
“The Choice is Yours”: The 1975 UK National Referendum
He who rejects change is the architect of decay. The only human institution which rejects
progress is the cemetery.
-Harold Wilson, January 23, 1967
_________________________

On July 3, 1975, Harold Wilson delivered a short speech at Camden Town Hall in
North London on the subject of why the UK should remain in the European Community.
A rambunctious atmosphere filled the packed hall. Members of the crowd began
shouting over Wilson shortly after his speech began. “Every minute you are interrupting
there is another one thousand votes for yes,” Wilson scolded, trusting that the British
public desired a polite debate rather than a shouting match. The hecklers only grew
louder. Wilson, becoming frustrated, asked if there were any communists in the
audience and accused the hecklers of “total intolerance.” Finally, after twenty minutes
of failing to be heard over the angry roar of the crowd, Wilson – still on stage – took a
sip of water, lit up his pipe, and smoked it to completion in silence while the crowd kept
screaming. Eventually the din died down, and Wilson resumed his speech.1 In that
moment, Harold Wilson came face to face with the furious public resistance to Britain’s
membership in the EEC. He responded with a touch of ideological grandstanding, then
by stepping back and relaxing while the hecklers shouted themselves hoarse – by
knowing when his voice had outgrown its use and letting the voice of the public take
over, whether they supported him or not. On a larger scale, this same strategy was at
the heart of the 1975 UK referendum.

1

“Wilson speech drowned out by hecklers,” Liverpool Daily Post, June 4, 1975
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The 1975 referendum was a shrewd political move by Wilson in his ongoing
struggles with both the Conservative opposition and the anti-Europe wing of his own
party, but it was also the watershed moment in which Britons were finally forced to
decide what sort of nation Britain would become. Since World War II, most Britons
were content with their nation’s independent, “Finest Hour”-tinged identity. The
economy was in disarray, Britain’s international influence was on the decline, but that
was all the more reason to hunker down and trust the British stiff upper lip to see the
UK through to its next finest hour. For decades, the British government had been
moving toward closer ties with Europe in fits and starts. However, every step that it
took was cut short, either by a firm “Non” from General De Gaulle or by the lingering
power of the “Finest Hour” narrative. By 1975, De Gaulle had stepped away from power
as the result of losing a public referendum and Britain was a member of the ECC, but a
strong contingency of the British population – still clinging to Britain’s old identity –
was declaring EEC membership a betrayal of the nation and calling for withdrawal.
Wilson backed the referendum as a political ploy designed to restore unity to
Labour at a moment when it threatened to fracture into pro and anti-EEC camps, but
once he embraced the referendum he began to promote it is a final test of British intent.
Either the public would vote against EEC membership and maintain its World War II
identity or it would approve the EEC and commit itself to Europe. Wilson argued that
either choice would finally put an end to Britain’s infighting and indecision, and
consequently the nation’s decades-long identity crisis. Thus, though the referendum
had petty political origins, it quickly gained enormous symbolic value as the vehicle
through which Britons could go over their leadership’s head and choose the course that
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their nation would take. The Wilson Government consciously promoted this
interpretation, particularly in the informational pamphlets that it distributed to every
home in Britain. In doing so, it framed the referendum as a watershed moment in
British history – a moment in which the people could assert their ownership of British
national identity. Wilson did not set out to do this, but once the train started rolling it
could not be stopped. Wilson climbed aboard and claimed it as his own.
Origins of the Referendum
The referendum was conceived as a response to the perception that the British
government forced the UK into the ECC against the will of the people. In 1970, Harold
Wilson lost the national election to Edward Heath of the Conservative Party. Heath,
building on the groundwork laid by Wilson in his negotiations with the European heads
of state in 1967, promptly filed the UK’s third application for entry into the EEC. In the
years since the 1967 application, Charles De Gaulle stepped away from power and was
replaced by the more Anglo-friendly Georges Pompidou as President of France.
Without De Gaulle there to say “Non,” Britain finally joined the European Economic
Community in 1972. The public, however, remained deeply divided. A Gallup poll from
January 1975 – just after the referendum was officially announced – reported that fiftyfive percent of respondents were in favor of withdrawing from the EEC. Forty-five
percent wished to remain inside.2
This division extended to Wilson’s Labour Party, which despite falling in with
Wilson’s pro-Europe stance in 1967 became fiercely opposed to British membership in
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the EEC while out of power from 1970 to 1974. In his memoirs, Wilson characterized
this time as “a miserably unhappy period.”3 He was still Leader of the Labour Party, but
the Party was rebelling. Tony Benn, an influential Member of Parliament and champion
of the far-left who served as Chairman of the Labour Party for a year between 1971 and
1972, was the de facto leader of the “anti-marketeers” – the wing of the party opposed to
EEC membership. Benn led the charge in declaring that Heath sold Britain down the
river to Europe by accepting terms less favorable to the UK than the ones that Wilson
had been negotiating in 1967.
In particular, Benn attacked the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a mandatory
system for EEC members that established standard minimum prices for agriculture,
imposed tariffs on agricultural imports from outside the EEC, and provided major
subsidies to farms in EEC member states. In 1970, seventy percent of the EEC’s budget
was spent on the CAP.4 Benn and the anti-marketeers argued that the fixed prices
imposed by the CAP would increase food prices in the UK and that Britain would not
benefit from the associated subsidies due to its relatively small agriculture industry
compared to those of the other EEC member states. The result would be a rise in the
British standard of living with little accompanying benefit.
At this time, Labour endorsed the idea of a public referendum as a means of
deferring the EEC decision to the public. The idea for the referendum originally came
from the “Eurosceptic” wing of the Conservative Party, which proposed the referendum
to Parliament in 1969. The proposal failed, with only 55 Members of Parliament voting
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in its favor.5 After the Tories failed to make the referendum a reality, in 1972 the antimarketeers in Labour embraced the idea as a political weapon. Their goal was first and
foremost to damage Edward Heath’s Conservative government, which was criticized for
accepting terms of entry that were disadvantageous to Britain.6 The anti-marketeers
viewed the referendum as little more than a way to embarrass their opposition. Wilson,
standing strong in his conviction that Britain’s future was inside the EEC (though its
entry terms should be renegotiated), at first resisted the calls for referendum. In 1973,
however, he saw an opportunity.
In a bid to maintain control of his party, Wilson worked with Judith Hart – a
well-respected MP – in crafting a statement on Labour’s position on the EEC to be
included in the Party’s 1973 electoral platform. The statement was designed to appease
the anti-marketeers by stating that Labour “opposes British membership of the
European Communities on the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government,” but
supports continued British membership in the EEC under renegotiated conditions.7 The
statement laid out specific goals for renegotiation, including “major changes in the
Common Agricultural Policy” as well as “new and fairer methods of financing the
Community budget.” Most importantly, the proposal ended by declaring that “if
renegotiations are successful… in view of the unique importance of the decision, the
people should have the right to decide the issue.”8 Wilson submitted the program to the
Labour Party’s autumn 1973 conference. Though it required Wilson to threaten
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resignation and a subsequent Party leadership struggle on the eve of an election, the
National Executive Committee – Labour’s leadership body – eventually approved the
formula by a vote of 14 to 11.9 It was incorporated into Labour’s Programme 1973 – the
Party’s official public platform document.
Wilson embraced the referendum as a matter of managing his party, but it
quickly became much more. Bernard Donoughue, a senior policy advisor for Wilson at
the time, later wrote that Wilson’s objectives were “to prevent Labour from inescapably
committing itself to withdrawal from the EEC, and from breaking up the Party over the
issue.”10 By embracing the referendum and committing himself to promoting the “Yes”
vote, Wilson hoped to take what the anti-marketeers had planned as a weapon against
the Tories and turn it into a weapon against the anti-marketeers, all while seemingly
giving them what they wanted. However, though it started as a clever political tactic,
once embraced it became much more significant.
From the beginning, Wilson framed the referendum as a symbolic deference to
the British public. As there was no popular sovereignty in the British political system,
the referendum could never be legally required or technically binding. However, the
issue of Britain joining with Europe was billed as a matter of such importance to Britain
that even Parliament could not adequately speak for the people. As Wilson presented
the referendum, the question of joining with Europe was bigger than the government,
bigger than British law, and bigger than tradition. It was a matter of principle that only
the people themselves could answer, despite there being no precedent and no legal
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justification for a referendum. Unsurprisingly, the questionable constitutionality of the
referendum did not go unnoticed by the Conservative opposition.
The Fight for the Referendum
When Wilson returned to the office of the Prime Minister in 1970, one of his first
orders of business was to follow through on the promises of Labour’s Programme 1973
by meeting with the other European leaders and renegotiating Britain’s EEC
membership terms. The renegotiations, though they fell short of Wilson’s ambitious
goals, were fruitful enough for Wilson to declare them a success. Wilson did not
disclose the new terms, however, until March 1975 – two months after he declared
success and announced his intention to plan the referendum.
When he finally revealed the terms, in a White Paper titled Membership of the
European Community: Report on Renegotiation, it was in vague language. The White
Paper reported that “CAP price levels have been held down in real terms; progress has
been made towards relating them more closely to the needs of efficient producers, and
towards securing a better balance between supply and demand.”11 The paper did not
disclose the details of this “progress” beyond asserting that the European Commission
was reappraising the CAP and had recently submitted a report that “holds out prospects
both of further progress on the lines already advocated by the Government and of other
improvements which can be welcomed.”12 The White Paper was written as vaguely as
possible for a reason: no specific agreements were made between Wilson and the other
European leaders as to modifying the CAP – only an agreement to consider revision at
Membership of the European Community, Report on Renegotiation, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, 1975), paragraph 9
12 ibid, paragraph 29
11
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the CAP’s next scheduled periodic reappraisal.13 Wilson was likely wary of emphasizing
the achievements of his renegotiations, only to have it come out that they contained few
concrete changes. Nevertheless, the promise of future European flexibility was enough
for Wilson to move forward with the referendum.
In the early stages of planning the referendum, debate in Parliament focused
largely on the referendum’s implications for Parliamentary sovereignty. On January 23,
1975, Wilson delivered a speech in Parliament in which he officially announced the
Government’s decision to hold a referendum. At that point, the renegotiations were not
yet complete and Wilson refused to officially support continued EEC membership. He
merely discussed the logistics of the referendum. Early in his speech, he was
interrupted by Edward Heath – the man that Wilson had recently unseated as Prime
Minister. Heath called the referendum a “major constitutional innovation” and asked
Wilson to “confirm that the referendum, if it takes place, will be advisory and
consultative and cannot be binding on Members of the House of the Commons.”14
Wilson responded that he “cannot imagine that if the country votes clearly one way or
the other… honorable Members would feel able to go against that decision and vote
against.”15 Heath pushed back: “Whatever he [Wilson] may judge the attitude of right
honorable [Heath] and honorable Members to be, will he [Wilson] confirm that a
referendum cannot be constitutionally binding on any Member of this House, and that it
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remains for Parliament to decide, if it so wishes, after the referendum?”16 Wilson had
the final word on the subject:
The right honorable Gentleman is, of course, right in the constitutional sense that no one
can tell a Member of this House how to vote… In that sense, the referendum could not
be binding. But I perhaps pay more attention to the views of the people in the country
than the right honorable Gentleman… and I express the view that I could not imagine
many honorable Members deciding to pit their own judgment in this matter against what
has been the decision of the people of the country. That is just my view.17

On the surface, this retort reads as Wilson positioning himself as a populist leader wellattuned to the will people; however, it also shows him playing a much longer game. In
speeches such as this, Wilson argued that in the matter of outlining a new national
identity for Britain, the direct will of the British people was superior to British
constitutional theory, or even to the British government. Wilson agreed with Heath’s
claim that the referendum was a constitutional “innovation” with no legal value; his
response was to raise the stakes. British identity was the domain of the people, not of
the Government. Thus, though the referendum technically had no teeth, in Wilson’s
reckoning it was the duty of Parliament to accept the people’s will. Parliament may have
been sovereign, but Britain lived in the people. With the referendum eventually
approved, they were finally given the opportunity to decide Britain’s future.
The Referendum Campaign
During the brief three months of the official referendum campaign, British public
opinion swung from being narrowly opposed to the EEC to resoundingly in favor of
continued membership. A Gallup poll in January 1975 reported that fifty-five percent of
the British public wanted to withdraw from the EEC while forty-five percent supported
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membership; at the end of March, Gallup reported that sixty-six percent now supported
membership with thirty-four percent opposed.18 Many factors contributed to this
dramatic reversal. The pro-market side’s resource advantage was gbone such factor.
Though the Government gave the “Yes” and “No” campaigns equal starting
resources, the “Yes” campaign – which supported remaining in the EEC – was able to
create a substantially larger operation. The “Yes” and “No” campaigns centered around
two organizations: Britain in Europe (BIE), as indicated by its name, supported
continued EEC membership; the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) was its
opposite number. Both of these organizations were given £125,000 by the Government
to conduct their campaigns and publish informational materials. BIE, however, was
able to raise another £1.8 million, primarily from pro-Europe businesses excited by the
thought of having unlimited access to the European market. The NRC only raised an
additional £8,610.19 The relative scale of the two organizations reflected this monetary
discrepancy. The BIE had 163 official paid employees; the NRC had six. 20 Finally, both
organizations published and distributed pamphlets advocating their respective
positions. These pamphlets, with the help of the Government, were distributed to every
house in every town in Britain. The Government, however, released its own pamphlet
advocating EEC membership as well.21 Thus, the average Briton received two pamphlets
in favor of voting “Yes” – one of them carrying the seal of the Government – and only
one in favor of voting “No.” Taken together, these facts indicate that at least part of the
“Yes” campaign’s success can be credited to its ability to outspend and outwork the
Andy Mullen and Brian Burkitt, “Spinning Europe: Pro-European Union Propaganda Campaigns in
Britain, 1962-1975,” Political Quarterly, January 1, 2005, p. 109
19 ibid, p. 108
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competition. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a campaign propaganda advantage
alone accounting for a twenty-one point swing in poll numbers in just three months.
The “Yes” campaign’s economic advantage only worked because it was used to promote
a message that resonated with the British people.
The best place to examine that message is in the Government pamphlet sent to
every household in Britain. That pamphlet, titled “Britain’s New Deal in Europe,” was
the centerpiece of the “Yes” campaign. It began with a letter from Wilson that
emphasized the historic nature of the decision and closed with the statement, “Above all,
I ask you to use your vote. For it is your vote that will now decide. The Government will
accept your verdict.”22 The next section, headed “Your Right to Choose,” reminded
readers: “The British people were promised the right to decide through the ballot box
whether or not we should stay in the Common Market on new terms. And that the
Government would abide by the result… The Government have recommended that
Britain should stay in… But you have the right to choose.”23 Before the pamphlet even
presented an argument for why readers should vote to stay in the EEC, it devoted its
first two sections to again emphasizing that this was a choice for the people, not the
Government. The pamphlet made no mention of the questionable constitutionality of
the referendum. Quite the opposite, it asserted multiple times that the people’s decision
would be binding. Wilson’s concession to Heath in Parliament that the referendum
could not be constitutionally binding was deemed an unimportant technicality. Again,
the Wilson government sent the clear message that despite centuries of tradition, the
British people – not Parliament – had the ultimate say in determining Britain’s future.
22
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Finally, on page five, the pamphlet began to present its argument for EEC
membership, though its specifics were even vaguer than those in the White Paper that
was earlier circulated in Parliament. The pamphlet described the aims of the EEC as
“To bring together the peoples of Europe” and “To help maintain peace and freedom.”24
In a section titled “The New Deal,” the pamphlet quotes Wilson in saying that “I believe
that our renegotiation objectives have been substantially though not completely
achieved.” In describing those achievements, however, it simply says that “the Common
Agricultural policy… now works more flexibly to the benefit of both housewives and
farmers in Britain.” The only specifics it cites are “special arrangements made for sugar
and beef,” without saying what those arrangements are.25 To counteract the argument
that staying in the EEC would be a betrayal of the Commonwealth, the pamphlet quoted
statements of support for the EEC from the Prime Ministers of Australia and New
Zealand.26 Responding to fears that the EEC would strip away British sovereignty, the
pamphlet reminded readers that “in the modern world even the Super Powers… do not
have complete freedom of action. Medium-sized nations like Britain are more and more
subject to economic and political forces we cannot control on our own.”27
Finally, the pamphlet painted two scenarios of the future: one for “If We Say ‘No’”
and one for “If We Say ‘Yes.’” The “No” scenario was bleak. “The Common Market will
not go away if we say ‘No,’” the pamphlet argued, “We would just be outsiders looking
in.”28 The “Yes” scenario, on the other hand, depicted a world in which life would still
be tough in Britain, but it would have access to Europe’s markets, incoming European
ibid, p. 5
ibid, p. 6-7
26 ibid, p. 10
27 ibid, p. 11-12
28 ibid, p. 13
24
25

66

Community money, and the ability to play a role in setting the policies of what the
writers called the “world’s most powerful trading bloc.”29 This final point was at the
heart of the pamphlet’s pro-EEC argument.
As framed by the Wilson government, the referendum was a choice between
Britain being something greater than itself or remaining a chain of islands in the
Atlantic inching ever closer to isolation; between staying in the present or entering an
unknown, exciting future. Only Britons could make that choice. The pamphlet urged
them to vote “Yes,” but concluded with ten empowering words: “The choice is up to
YOU. It is YOUR decision.”30
This constant emphasis on the agency of the voters seems like a psychological
ploy – a way to make Britons feel like they had control – but the fact is that Britons truly
were in control. Wilson’s commitment to the referendum was a gamble. He placed his
reputation – and likely his leadership – on the line in order to keep his party together
and finally force Britain off the fence that it had been sitting on for decades. By arguing
that the referendum should be upheld as a matter of principle though it was not
constitutionally binding, Wilson locked himself into submitting to the will of the people,
whatever it may be. What started for Wilson as a political ploy turned into a full-scale
assault on Parliamentary sovereignty. The referendum symbolized that Britain’s
identity did not live in Parliament; it did not live in British tradition; it did not even live
in the Queen. It lived in the British people.
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On June 5, 1975, the citizens of the UK were asked the question: “Do you think
that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (The Common
Market)?” Approximately 40,086,000 Britons voted – a 64% turnout. The results were
conclusive: 67.2% voted “Yes” to remaining in the EEC; 32.8% voted no.31 All four parts
of the United Kingdom – England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland – reported a
majority for the “Yes” vote, with the widest margin in England (68.7% vs. 31.3%) and the
narrowest in Northern Ireland (52.1% vs. 47.9%). The people had spoken. They had
much more to say, however, than could ever be reflected in a simple “Yes” or “No.” An
examination of the public discourse leading up the referendum reveals just how painful
a process it was for Britons to embrace Europe, but that they did it all the same.
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Chapter Four
England’s Dreaming: The 1975 Referendum in Public Discourse
God Save the Queen, we mean it man; and there is no future in England’s dreaming.
-The Sex Pistols, God Save the Queen, 1977
_______________________________

During the three months of the 1975 EEC referendum campaign – and
particularly during May, the final full month – British regional newspapers were
inundated with a flood of letters from common Britons weighing in on the nation’s great
debate. These letters differed from the similar influx of letters during the 1967 debate.
In 1967, most letter writers opposed EEC membership. By 1975, most favored joining
the EEC. The memory of World War II loomed large in both batches of letters.
However, in 1967 it was almost exclusively a rationale for keeping out of Europe.
Britons didn’t need Europe in the 1940s, the argument went; why would they need it
now?
In 1975, that interpretation of World War still lingered for some, but others now
contested it. A new narrative was taking form that stressed that World War II was in
fact about ending Europe’s history of nationalistic infighting once and for all. The EEC,
then, was a direct extension of the legacy of World War II – it was the binding together
of Europe to ensure that the horrors of that war would never be repeated.
Britons contested another dominant narrative from 1967 in the 1975 public
debate: the myth of British resilience. In the 1967, the narrative of British toughness –
that the British Bulldog could take on the world alone and that joining with Europe was
a sign of weakness – was the sole domain of the anti-marketeers. In 1975, the pro69

marketeers subverted that narrative. The anti-marketeers were the cowards in the new
narrative, afraid that Britain would be unable to compete with the rest of Europe on an
even footing. True British toughness would be having the backbone to stay in the EEC;
not just competing in the European market, but leading it into a new age of prosperity.
Finally, Britons once again debated the subject of British sovereignty, but this
time the debate was complicated by the referendum itself. The 1967 narrative that the
EEC would allow Europe to dominate the UK and erode its national sovereignty was still
intact in 1975 – though the fact that Britain had already been a member of the EEC for
three years and the Queen was not yet in shackles made that argument less prominent.
In 1975, however, the argument had a counterpoint. The referendum that would allow
Britons to leave the EEC – originally proposed by anti-marketeers – was, supporters
argued, itself a violation of Parliamentary sovereignty. Voting against the EEC in the
referendum, and thereby overruling Parliament, would violate the basic tenets of the
British constitution. In the words of one letter-writer from Sutton Coldfield, if the
objective was to preserve traditional British sovereignty, the situation was “Heads I win,
tails you lose.”1 The true choice facing Britons, then, was not between sovereignty and
European domination, but between two different avenues for undermining traditional
Parliamentary sovereignty.
The 1975 public debate focused on the same general themes as the 1967 debate,
but in 1975 they were subverted and contested to suit the needs of a population that,
spurred on by their government’s failure to improve their quality of life or restore
British international prestige, was finally ready to move toward a new Britain. All of the
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same anti-Europe arguments were mounted, but they were a statistical minority even
among the small group of voters who were motivated enough to write in to their local
newspapers. Far more common were the letters in which writers embraced a new
narrative British history in order to create a new future. The past will always be a part of
the present, but in 1975 Britons proved that the past can be malleable. They were ready
to wake up from England’s dreaming.
By subtly shifting the narrative of their past, Britons transformed their history
from a force that defended the status quo into a force for change. If the 1967 debate
proved that history can be a powerful causal force, the 1975 referendum proved that it
can also be marshaled as a vital tool in framing large political departures. History can
be a controlling factor, but given enough motivation it can also be controlled. This
chapter will examine that process at work in the original words of those who voted in the
1975 referendum.
Going It Alone: Independence or Isolation?
Four centuries ago, John Donne wrote “No man is an island, entire of itself; everyman
is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main.” Today we can say with equal certainty
that no country is an island entire of itself no matter how much water surrounds it.2
-John Laure, 24, Oakdale Close, Downend, Bristol, 1975
Free from the ties of bureaucracy we can as individuals still show the spirit of the
British Bulldog. Certainly there is nothing wrong in this country that the British people
cannot rectify, given the opportunity.3
-Denis C. Barrett, Birmingham 90, 1975
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In the months leading up to the 1975 referendum, Britons debated what it meant
for their nation to be an island – literal and metaphorical. The two letters excerpted
above represented the two extremes of the argument. Britain had long been on an
independent course. As an island without the national resources to maintain its large,
modern population, it had always been dependent on the imports of other nations.
However, those other nations were traditionally former British colonies – primarily the
Commonwealth nations and the United States. As such, they were part of Britain’s
extended family and fit into Britain’s framework of perceived independence. 4 Joining
the EEC, however, meant recognizing – and codifying – British dependence on states
other than its family members. In 1967, this caused outrage. By 1975, many had
accepted it as a fact of life.
A letter from S. Mitchell in the Evening Post summarized the mood well.
Advocating for a “Yes” vote in the referendum, Mitchell wrote: “These islands have, of
course, always been ‘specks on the globe,’ and for years I had marveled at the fact that
we held sway over a quarter of the globe. But things are different now. We cannot ‘push
outward’ and discover new lands and colonise a quarter of the world, which made these
‘small specks of ours’ a force to be reckoned with…”5 Mitchell’s words hold a sense of
resignation. In his reckoning, the Empire was almost a fluke – something to be proud
of, but something that was forever lost. Britain was, in fact, dependent on other
countries. Britain’s EEC membership was simply a recognition of reality.

Though the United States had rebelled against Britain, it was linked almost as strongly as the
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Alison Tyler reflected that same resignation in her letter to the Birmingham Post.
“Personally, I find it hard to see a future for Britain at all,” she lamented. “But I do think
that if we have a future, it is to be found within the EEC.” She concluded her letter with
a call for Britons to open their eyes to reality: “There is no [time] now for empire
building mythology and narrow-minded nationalism; we are unable to go it alone…
united [with Europe] we will have more influence and can press for better conditions.” 6
Tyler’s comments demonstrated a self-awareness that did not seem to exist in 1967. In
identifying and denouncing a British “mythology,” Tyler consciously recognized the
influence of history on past EEC debates and sought to excise it from the present.
Michael Steel picked up on this same thread in a different letter when he wrote: “It is a
destructive mixture of pride and possessiveness which makes it difficult for a people
with a history like ours to make any compromise with other nations for the common
good.”7 Not every pro-Europe letter-writer grappled with historical memory so directly,
but even those who did not helped to shift Britain’s relationship with its past by
implicitly embracing the new narrative.
Tyler’s letter featured another common argument: that the EEC was a reality
whether Britain liked it or not, and that the only way for Britain to influence its policies
was from the inside. “We know that at present the EEC is far from perfect,” wrote T. H.
Fowler of Redditch. “Could we not help to shape its future development and help mould
both the political and economic ideals? We shan’t do so by remaining in isolation.”8
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Tyler called for Britons to be proactive in changing the EEC to better suit their needs,
rather than being reactive and insular by quitting the EEC.
Arguments such as these took the resignation exhibited in letters above and made
it into something constructive. Accepting a smaller world role did not mean abandoning
all influence on the world, these writers argued. To the contrary, by working on a
smaller, more realistic scale, Britain could be more effective in pursuing its world
interests than it had been since before World War II. Bristol’s Betty Letts made this
exact point when she wrote: “What Britain has lost in her Empire she can regain as a
dominant and respected influence in Europe, and see her humanitarian policies applied
world wide.”9 Alan Lawson, an insurance broker, went straight to the heart of this line
of argument in a Birmingham Post column called “The Post Six,” in which the Post
asked six “regular” people to give their views on the referendum each week for the
month leading up to the vote. “We have lost an empire, and for the last thirty years we
have been looking for a role in the world. I wonder if this is it,” he opined.10
Lawson spoke for many, but not for all. Peter Hollingsworth, in a letter printed
on April 14, launched a direct attack on the argument that Britain must accept its
dependence on other nations. “We have always been a small collection of islands,” he
wrote. “We thrive when the odds appear against us… I am confident the British people
will choose to stay independent.”11 Lawson’s argument for “independence” was echoed
by many. D. A. Gordon wrote: “The referendum is an opportunity to recall our
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independence and to make a start to regain our self respect.”12 Gordon’s tying together
of “independence” and “self-respect” is important. The link between British
international superiority and Britons’ personal sense of meaning – so present in the
1967 debate – was still alive and well for at least some voters in the 1975 referendum.
For many letter-writers, British independence and self-respect were so closely
tied that they felt a deep sense of betrayal and shame toward their country for steering
them into the EEC in the first place. “If we are not man enough to put our house in
order alone,” wrote Richard Elliott, “we will forever bow our heads in shame as the
white beggar of Europe.”13 Elliott wanted Britain to work out its problems alone before
it joined with any international agreement, EEC or otherwise. To do anything else
would be to accept charity – in Elliott’s reckoning, something of which Britons should be
ashamed.
The “independence” argument did not go unchallenged. Some, such as Perry
Barr’s A. Crossley, turned the anti-marketeers’ narrative of British “toughness” against
them. To the anti-marketeers, Britain had no need for Europe, such was the toughness
of its inner bulldog. Crossley, however, argued that that same bulldog demanded that
Britain test its mettle by competing with Europe in the EEC. “Are we so spineless, so
lacking in our ability to compete that we must run away from Europe and take refuge
behind a tariff wall?” he asked.14 Pro-marketeers also commonly refuted the
“independence” argument by responding that independence went hand-in-hand with a
continued downward spiral. A perfect example of this line of thinking came from Peter
D. A. Gordon, Beresford House, 1, Clifton Hill, Bristol BS8, “Punishes the poor,” Evening Post, May 30,
1975, Voice of the West
13 Richard Elliott, Birminghom 20, “Not yet fit,” Birmingham Post, Letters to the Editor, June 5, 1975
14 A. Crossley, Perry Barr, Birmingham, “…Shaming,” Birmingham Post, May 6, 1975, Letters to the Editor
12

75

Corrigan, who wrote: “If we came out of the Common Market we would be ‘independent’
– to govern a siege economy and a steadily decreasing standard of living. Would those
who died in two world wars and those who love their country say this is a price they
would pay for ‘independence’?”15 Corrigan’s letter not only refuted the “toughness”
narrative, but challenged the anti-marketeers’ control over what had long been their
exclusive territory: the legacy of World War II.
The Battle for World War II
The legacy of World War II, once a unifying national myth, was contested in 1975.
For many, the wounds were still sore and trusting Europe still impossible. Councillor
Richard Reynolds of Wolverhampton was one such individual. “Let the pro-marketeers
be in no doubt that Germany will be the predominant nation in the EEC,” he wrote.
“Why should we be defeated by them now, by back-door methods, when so much blood
was shed to defeat the regime that ruled in that country thirty years ago?”16 S. T.
Perrens made a slightly different argument. Rather than worry about German
domination, Perrens expressed a distaste for French ambition. Nevertheless, the
language was still colored by World War II: “…one thing people seem to have forgotten.
If it had not been for Britain in 1940 there would not have been a France… They owe us
their existence and we should not allow France to dictate to us what we shall do or not
do.”17
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To these writers, the battles of World War II were still taking place. Britain was
still the savior of Europe, and Germany was still on the march. An anonymous writer to
the Liverpool Daily Post warned that the EEC represented “a great peril… [another]
invasion of Europe.”18 However, while this view was the norm in 1967, in 1975 it
appeared with much less frequency. Opinions such as the following were more
common: “Those of us who recall the state of post war Europe require no other reason
for pushing towards unity in a continent which tore itself to pieces with sickening
regularity. For behind the European aspirations of the 1970s lie the ruins of the 1940s
and the determination that nothing like the events of 1939 to 1945 shall ever occur
again.”19 In this letter and those like it, the pro-marketeers set out to reclaim the legacy
of World War II for the European integration movement, and for at least the months
leading up to the 1975 referendum they were largely successful.
Pro-marketeers did not stop at reclaiming World War II; they often went much
further back in British history in order to establish a narrative in which European
integration was the next phase of an ongoing process. Two prime examples are the
letters of L. W. Wilson of Edgbaston and G. F. Elvins of Birmingham. Wilson wrote:
…we should remember that this country was once made up of seven separate kingdoms…
Yet who could now seriously wish that the seven kingdoms were still in existence
carrying on their recurring wars against each other instead of football and cricket
contests between the counties. Will not future generations wonder for the same reason
how we ever hesitated to remain part of the United States of Europe?20
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On a similar note, Elvins argued that “the basic reason for remaining in the EEC is one
of historic evolution which should not be impeded… One combines first with one’s
neighbours, then as a group with similar groups, until eventually the whole world is
one.”21 These letters were idealistic and likely not representative of the larger
population, but they show just how much Britain’s history was being contested in the
1975 debate. The anti-marketeers went sometimes back just as far into Britain’s past, as
in the case of one writer who asserted that the Magna Carta would be “mangled into
obscurity” by the EEC.22
History was the battleground, and for the three months of 1975 it was in flux.
Britons were about to vote on a new future, and in doing so they were faced with
forming a new narrative of their past. History, however, was not the only field being
contested.
Sovereignty and Constitutionality
In the 1975 referendum debate, the pro-marketeers did not refute their
opposition’s claim that joining the EEC meant sacrificing British sovereignty; rather,
they countered that the referendum was doing the exact same thing. A version of the
basic anti-marketeer talking point can be found in a letter by one Alan Meadowcroft: “If
we become members of the federal state to be made from the EEC, we will have
superimposed on our monarchial constitution a European presidential system. The
Queen will become the mere subject of a European president… Every part of our
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constitution will be debased if the European entanglement continues.”23 The common
pro-marketeer response, as put forth in an editorial that expressed the official opinion of
the Evening Post: “On loss of sovereignty by our Parliament we agree that there must
be some give, as in any partnership, but would be more impressed by those who are
trying to scare us about it if they were not led by precisely those who are weakening
Parliament by foisting a referendum on us.”24 From those foundational points, the
debate took on many different permutations.
J. J. York of Sutton Coldfield also expressed the issue clearly:
It would appear that many anti-Marketeers are terrified of a loss of sovereignty caused
by our continuing membership of the EEC. However, it would also seem that these
people are the strongest supporters of that constitutional disaster, the referendum,
which is, by its very existence, a far greater loss of sovereignty, should the result be held
as binding on Parliament as most anti-Marketeers wish.25

As was discussed in the previous chapter, the answer to the question of whether the
referendum would be binding was both yes and no. As a matter of law, Wilson conceded
that it would not be constitutionally binding. Nevertheless, he declared that it as a
matter of principal, the Government would accept the peoples’ choice. Thus, it was de
facto binding. Given Britain’s unwritten constitution, the distinction was not much
more than a matter of rhetoric.
Many, both pro and anti-marketeers, objected to the referendum not simply on
constitutional grounds, but because they felt that the public did not know enough about
the issues at stake. “Ordinary people are not capable of assessing the intricacies of the
economic problems involved,” wrote a Hinckley resident. “The majority of people do
Alan Meadowcroft, 49 Verney Road, Royton, Oldham, Lancashire, “Sovereign rights lost,” Express &
Star, May 30, 1975, Letters to the Editor
24 Editorial Staff, “Yes – a vote for vision,” Evening Post, May 4, 1975
25 J. J. York, Sutton Coldfield, “…Terrified,” The Birmingham Post, May 9, 1975, Letters to the Editor
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not wish to have the referendum because these are matters which should be left to
Parliament.”26 Other writers took a different tack, arguing that sovereignty was no use
if Britain was not powerful enough to wield it. One Briton asked: “What is sovereignty
without power or dominion? …I don’t think we shall be important outside [Europe],
because we are weak and divided – and what use would our national sovereignty be
then?”27 This writer would preferred to have seen a powerful Britain capable of exerting
its influence on the world than a weak Britain that preserved its national sovereignty but
faded into international obscurity. The recurring appearance of this pragmatic
approach to sovereignty demonstrated the lengths to which some Britons were willing to
go find a new future for their struggling country. To return Britain to relevance, they
were consciously willing to bring down everything that conventionally defined Britain.
The anti-marketeers, in rebuttal, argued that though the referendum was a
violation of Parliamentary sovereignty, it was nevertheless the lesser of two evils. G. E.
Lillywhite of Cheltenham took this tack in a letter from April 17: “[Politicians] must
again inform and consult their electors as they should always have done, but have now
ceased to do… Until we return to this closer liaison, which should be the normal
process, to talk of constitutional methods and democratic institutions is hypocrisy.” 28
For Lillywhite, the ideal of Parliamentary sovereignty was already lost when Parliament
grew out of touch with the population. The referendum was merely an attempt to force
Parliament to once again listen to the people. Gerald Glynn of Erdington expressed the
same sentiment in a sly letter that evoked English satirist W. S. Gilbert: “Gilbert would
A. J. Barnes, Hinckley, “Labour moderates must join Wilson,” Birmingham Post, April 7, 1975, Letters
to the Editor
27 Miss Anne Scott, “The Post Six on sovereignty,” Birmingham Post, May 13, 1975, The Post Six
28 G. E. Lillywhite, Cheltenham, “Why politicians fear the EEC referendum,” Birmingham Post, April 17,
1975, Letters to the Editor
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have loved that – [politicians] trying to persuade us that a course of action [the
referendum] ‘affronts Parliamentary sovereignty’ when that precise action is, in fact, the
only means left to the people of this country to ensure a continuance of that
sovereignty.”29
In fighting over sovereignty in 1975, both sides of the debate recognized that this
moment was a turning point for traditional British notions of Parliamentary
sovereignty. Either Britain’s first national public referendum would overrule Parliament
and make the term “Parliamentary sovereignty” meaningless, or Britain would remain
in the EEC and forfeit an unforeseeable degree of its national independence. Either
way, there was no going back, but such was the enormity of the choice that Britons had
to make. Britain would change; it was simply a matter of how.
In the months leading up to the 1975 referendum, Britons grappled with their
past as a means of determining their future. They contested the nature of British
independence and British toughness; they contested the legacy of World War II; they
contested what it meant to be British. Ultimately, after hundreds of pages of words had
been poured onto the pages of newspapers across the country, Britain’s decades-long
identity crisis came down to a single vote. By a majority of 67.2%, Britons voted in favor
of a new European identity, and in doing so a break from their past.
In 1975, Britons overcame a national identity that had held sway on British
politics since World War II. As their own words show, they did this by marshaling their
history in order to create a new narrative of their past. History is not a set of facts; it is

Gerald Glynn, Erdington, Birmingham 24, “A Gilbertian situation over Common Market,” Birmingham
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the connective tissue between those facts that gives them shape and tells a story. By
telling a different story, Britons suggested a different ending. Their achievement did not
mark the end of Britain’s struggle to define itself. Rather, it demonstrated that national
identity is in a state of flux, and when the moment is right it can be shifted in ways that
change how a state behaves. Harold Wilson’s decision to call the bluff of Parliamentary
sovereignty made this possible in Britain. No matter how old and storied a nation’s
institutions, its identity always lives in its people.
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Conclusion
The Song Remains the Same
The British Empire may have vanished from the map, but it has not entirely vanished from the
mind.
-David Cannadine, 2001
______________________________

In the autumn of 2011, Sir Salman Rushdie delivered a convocation lecture at
Oberlin College. In that speech, he expounded upon an axiom credited to Heraclitus:
“character is destiny.” The truth of that statement, Rushdie argued, could be illustrated
by Charles Schultz’s Peanuts gang – specifically, Lucy’s nasty habit of pulling the
football away from Charlie Brown every time that he moves in for a kick. Charlie
inevitably tumbles through the air and hurts himself, yet time and again he remains
hopeful that this will be the moment that he finally kicks the ball. Yet, “if Charlie Brown
successfully kicks the football,” Sir Rushdie said, “he ceases to be Charlie Brown.” If
Charlie Brown’s role in the narrative changes, the character would fundamentally
change with it. He would no longer be recognizable to his audience, his friends, or
himself. If his function changed, he would lose his identity. Thankfully, Schultz never
let such a thing happen.
But what would happen if, despite Sir Rushdie’s warning, Charlie Brown were to
kick that football? Charlie gets lucky and makes contact. The football goes flying. He
would no longer be “Charlie Brown,” so who would this new person be? How does that
person react? What does that person become? Charlie Brown’s hypothetical dilemma is
a stand-in for any individual or collective with a distinct identity that faces a moment of
no return in which its defining identity is shorn away and it is left with the choice of
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reinvention or descent into irrelevance. It is a question faced by every workaholic who
retires or is let go, every obsessive parent whose children move away, and every longterm spouse who unwillingly faces divorce. It was also a question that faced the people
of Great Britain after World War II, though they did not admit it for some time.
In many ways, however, Charlie Brown’s football is still in the air. Britons voted
to stay in the EEC in 1975, and in doing so showed that in that moment they had broken
from their past and adopted a new national identity closer to Europe. They achieved
this enormous feat by marshaling their history, just as the opponents of the EEC
successfully did in 1967. Britons wrested their history from the grasp of Churchill’s
“Finest Hour” narrative and, following Harold Wilson’s lead, forged a new narrative in
which Britain was simply entering the next phase of the inevitable process of
integration. By doing this, Britons proved that though history holds enormous influence
on a nation’s identity, it is not set in stone. National narratives can be contested;
national identities can be changed. However, this state of constant flux cuts both ways.
Shifts in national identity can be undone just as surely as they can be made. The 1975
Referendum did not resolve Britain’s identity crisis; it merely marked a moment of
momentary consensus.
While doing research for this thesis in London during the month of January
2012, I was surprised to find how many of the themes of my research still resonated in
today’s Britain. My time in London coincided with a tense moment in the Eurozone
crisis that began in 2011, and the language with which Londoners spoke of the European
Union was remarkably similar to the language used in 1967. One cabbie I spoke to
referred to the austerity measures being imposed on the struggling Eurozone states by
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Germany as “German boots back on the march.” Another referred to Britain’s
membership in the EU as “nothing but sand being kicked in our face.” British
newspapers ran opinion pieces ruing the day that Britain joined the EEC. The pieces
that I read never once mentioned the 1975 referendum. It seems that many modern
Britons would rather not remember that they voted overwhelmingly in favor of EEC
membership in 1975, for then they would have no one to blame for their current troubles
but themselves.
In the end, many of the flashpoints of the 1967 and 1975 EEC debates proved
artificial. Charlie Brown kicked the football, but he remained Charlie Brown. Britons
feared that by joining the EEC they would forfeit the Commonwealth, but the
Commonwealth’s political ties last to this day, though its economic ties have weakened.
They were convinced that the Queen would become nothing more than a smiling
figurehead, but EEC membership had no bearing on that inevitability. They worried
that Britain would become a subservient state in a federal Europe, but a half-century
later the UK remains sovereign. In fact, the greatest threat to the preservation of the UK
as of this writing is the Scottish independence movement, which has secured a
referendum to be held in 2014 that will determine whether Scotland will remain in the
UK. Considering that Great Britain was created by the union of England and Scotland in
1707, if Scotland becomes independent it will no longer make sense to speak of British
national identity at all. The true danger to British national identity is fragmentation, not
assimilation.
Britain’s identity crisis is unlikely to end any time soon. The great achievement
of the 1975 referendum was that there is now more than one option. Britons created an
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alternative narrative of their history, an alternative national identity, and an alternative
vision of their future. They gave themselves a choice, and that choice has continued to
face them anew every day since. As the Wilson Government constantly reminded voters
in the lead-up to the referendum, the important thing is that the choice is in their hands
and no one else’s, though that can sometimes be difficult to remember. Every day is a
new referendum.
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